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RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL STEP
TRANSACTION PRINCIPLE AND A PROPOSAL FOR
CODIFICATION
Yoram Keinan*
Since Gregory v. Helvering,' courts have been applying various
"common law" doctrines, such as substance over form, step transaction,
business purpose, sham transaction, and economic substance to
challenge tax motivated transactions.2  These doctrines have played an
important role in numerous court decisions3  and in the recent
" Yoram Keinan is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Michigan Law School, Georgetown
Law Center and American University Washington College of Law, and a Senior Manager with
Ernst & Young's Financial Services Industry Group and the Capital Markets Tax Practice of the
National Tax Department in Washington, D.C. As a Senior Manager at Ernst & Young, he
specializes in United States taxation of financial products and institutions. He received his M.P.A.
and I.T.P (International Taxation) from Harvard, LL.M. (Taxation), and S.J.D from the University
of Michigan.
1. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
2. See generally, Yoram Keinan, The Many Faces of the Economic Substance's Two-Prong
Test: Time for Reconciliation? 1 N.Y.U. J. Bus. & LAW 372 (2005).
3. Killingsworth v. Comm'r, 864 F.2d 1214, 1216 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Since Gregory was
decided, courts have consistently held that although a transaction may, on its face, satisfy applicable
Internal Revenue Code criteria, it will nevertheless remain unrecognized for tax purposes if it is
lacking in economic substance"); Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (dealing
with economic substance or reality of sale and leaseback transactions); Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960) (discussing interest expense deductions disallowed because only thing of
substance to be realized from transaction was tax deduction); Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324
U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (recognizing the step transaction doctrine, whereby courts must consider all
steps of transaction in light of entire transaction, so that substance of transaction will control over
form of each step); ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 233-43 (3d Cir. 1998), affg in part and
rev'g in part 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2189 (1997). (holding that the sophisticated investment partnership
was formed solely to generate a capital loss to shelter some of Colgate-Palmolive's capital gains);
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Comm'r, 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming the tax court's
determination that a program designed to increase leverage by obtaining funds from a Netherlands
corporation was not a sham and the tax benefits claimed were appropriate); Kirchman v. Comm'r,
862 F.2d 1486, 1491-95 (11th Cir. 1989); (holding that option straddles were entered into to
produce deductions with little risk of real loss); Karr v. Comm'r, 924 F.2d 1018, 1021-25 (1 1" Cir.
1991) (holding that energy enterprise were developed solely to produce deductible losses for
investors); Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that sale-
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government's proposals to fight corporate tax shelters.4 An important
feature of the common law doctrines is that they overlap each other in
many cases, and it is not uncommon for a court to decide to deny or not
to deny benefits on the grounds of more than one doctrine. 5
In many cases, taxpayers have adopted transaction forms that differ
from the true substance of the underlying transactions.6 This situation is
leaseback of a computer by a car dealership was entered into solely to generate depreciation
deductions); Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that an unprofitable,
leveraged acquisition of Treasury bills, and accompanying prepaid interest deduction, lacked
economic substance). See generally Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); Boris I. Bittker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the
Internal Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693, 707 (1978); Department of the Treasury, General
Explanations of the Administration's Revenue Proposals, Corporate Tax Shelters (Feb. 1999),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/grnbk99.pdf(last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
4. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OPTIONS To IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-2-05 (2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jcts-2-05.pdf. ("courts have applied the [common law] doctrines to deny tax
benefits arising from certain transactions."). In a subsequent summary, the JCT elaborated:
Recent tax avoidance transactions have relied upon the interaction of highly technical tax
law provisions to produce tax consequences not contemplated by Congress. A strictly
rule based tax system cannot prescribe the appropriate outcome of every conceivable
transaction that might be devised and is, as a result, incapable of preventing all
unintended consequences. Thus, many courts have long recognized the need to
supplement tax rules with anti-avoidance standards, such as the "economic substance"
doctrine, in order to assure the Congressional purpose is achieved. Under present law,
there is a lack of uniformity among the courts regarding the application of the economic
substance doctrine.
The proposal provides a uniform standard for applying the economic substance doctrine
to transactions having any of six characteristics present in many tax shelters. Under the
uniform standard, for a transaction to have economic substance, a taxpayer must
demonstrate that the transaction had a substantial non-tax purpose and changed the
taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way (apart from Federal tax
consequences). The fact that financial accounting benefits would result from the desired
tax treatment is not itself an allowable non-tax purpose. For transactions other than those
with any of the six characteristics, the proposal retains present law.
Joint Committee on Taxation, Summary of Joint Committee Staff "Options to Improve Tax
Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures ", Tax Notes Today, April 12, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT
72-32.
5. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, JCS-2-05 (2005), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf. ("The common-law doctrines are not entirely distinguishable,
and their application to a given set of facts is often blurred by the courts and the IRS"); Long-Term
Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 171 (D. Conn. 2004), aff'dper curiam, 150
Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The terminology used, whether sham, profit motivation, or
economic substance, is not critical, rather the analysis evaluates both the subjective business
purpose of the taxpayer for engaging in the transaction and the transaction's objective economic
substance").
6. See Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) ("In the field of
taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and
formal written documents are not rigidly binding").
[22:45
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commonly referred to as the "substance-over-form" principle, pursuant
to which a court can reclassify a transaction in accordance with its
form.7 In 1945, in Comm 'r v. Court Holding Co., the Supreme Court
held that:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction.
The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of property
are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed to
transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be viewed as a whole,
and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the
consummation of the sale, is relevant.... To permit the true nature of
a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to
alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration
of the tax policies of Congress!
The IRS has generally invoked the substance-over-form principle in
cases where the form of the transaction differed from its substance and
disallowed the associated tax benefits.9
Nevertheless, where substance and form differ by the taxpayer's
own choice, taxpayers may be required to suffer the tax consequences of
their form.10 Generally, the IRS can prevent taxpayers from disavowing
the form of their transactions, absent "strong proof' in some courts, I
I
and an even stricter standard referred to as the "Danielson" rule in other
courts. 12 In other words, the courts over the years have supported the
government's efforts both to assert substance over form but also to
require taxpayers to suffer the consequences of the form they have
selected.
13
The general doctrine of substance-over-form, however, has taken
various directions, with the creation of other related common law
doctrines. Generally, the doctrines that have emerged can be divided
7. United States. v. Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 1572 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he income tax
consequences under the Internal Revenue Code depend upon the substance of the situation, not the
form."). See also Newman v. Comm'r, 902 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[I]n reviewing a
transaction for tax consequences, the substance of the agreement takes precedence over its form").
8. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. at 334.
9. Id. See also Diane K. Klopsch, What are the Real Requirements for Interest
Deductibility? An Analysis of Revenue Procedure 94-27, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 145, 148-53 (1995)
(discussing the courts' and the IRS's use of the substance-over-form doctrine in income tax law).
10. Comm'r v. Nat'l Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149 (1974); Comm'r
v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cit. 1967).
11. Schultz v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 52, 55 (9th Cir. 1961) aff'g 34 T.C 235 (1960) (quoting
Ullman v. Comm'r, 264 F.2d 305, 307-08 (2d Cit. 1959)); Kreider v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 580, 586-
87 (7th Cir. 1985); Major v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 239, 249 (1981).




Keinana: Rethinking the Role of the Judicial Step Transaction Principle an
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON TAX JOURNAL
into two subtests under the substance-over-form doctrine: 14 (i) the
economic substance/sham transaction doctrines (with the business
purpose doctrine included as the subjective prong), and (ii) the step
transaction doctrine. 15 The latter one is the subject of this article.
The step transaction doctrine has played an important role in
challenging tax shelters.16 As early as 1938, the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that "a given result at the end of a straight path is not
made a different result because reached by following a devious path.' 17
Courts apply the step transaction doctrine in cases where taxing the
individual steps of a transaction rather than the transaction as a whole
would eviscerate the substance of the transaction resulting in improper
tax treatment of the whole transaction. 18 If the court finds that applying
the doctrine is appropriate it can either: (i) disregard transactions or steps
in a transaction that it believes are unnecessary;' 9 or (ii) change the order
of such transaction or steps. 20 Nevertheless, the IRS may not "generate
14. See Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law and 'Clear Reflection of Income':
What Constrains Discretion? 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 445, 471 (1999) ("Substance over form
and its variations, including 'step transaction' and 'business purpose' doctrines, are prominent
examples of judicially-developed interpretive doctrines that courts use to avoid textual constraints,
particularly when the text produces a result unfavorable to the Government").
15. See True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) (referring to the step
transaction doctrine as an "incarnation of the basic substance over form principle"); Sec. Indus. Ins.
Co. v. United States., 702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The step transaction doctrine is a
corollary of the general tax principle that the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a
transaction rather than its form"); Brown v. United States, 782 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1986).
16. Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 B.C.
L. REv. 587, 597-98 (2001).
Just as was the case with the substance over form doctrine and the business purpose
doctrine, the step transaction doctrine has become a central feature in income tax
adjudication. Its use is particularly pronounced in the corporate income tax area of the
law. [footnote omitted] Courts skillfully apply this doctrine to see the forest rather than
taxpayers' deliberately planted trees that would otherwise camouflage their carefully laid
tax avoidance schemes.
Id.
17. Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938). See also Comm'r v. Clark, 489
U.S. 726, 738 (1989).
18. Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 2001) aff'g 78
T.C.M. (CCH) 1183 (1999). ("[A] particular step in a transaction is disregarded for tax purposes if
the taxpayer could have achieved its objective more directly, but instead included the step for no
other purpose than to avoid U.S. taxes."); Grove v. Comm'r, 490 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1973)
(noting that the step transaction doctrine applies to "meaningless intervening steps in a single,
integrated transaction designed to avoid tax liability by the use of mere formalisms").
19. Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *97 (2002). See also Andantech
L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972, 981-82 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
20. Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) ("To permit the true nature of a
transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would
seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress").
[22:45
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events which never took place just so an additional tax liability might be
asserted.,
2 1
The courts have articulated three different threshold tests for
determining when it is appropriate to apply the step transaction doctrine:
(1) the "binding commitment" test; (2) the "end result test;" and (3) he
"mutual interdependence" test.22  Nevertheless, as discussed in this
article, the first test is rarely used, and the other two are generally not
different from each other as a practical matter.
The step transaction doctrine was rarely discussed by commentators
as opposed to the economic substance doctrine, which has drawn the
attention of many commentators.23 In my view, this is probably due to
the fact that while the economic substance doctrine has been applied
very inconsistently among Circuit Courts,24 there is less confusion in
regards to the application of the step transaction doctrine. In general, the
main controversy pertaining to the application of the step transaction
principle is whether the court can apply the doctrine if each step by itself
or the whole transaction has economic substance/business purpose. As
this article will show, courts are generally divided with respect to this
issue.
While in the past, in many cases (such as True v. U.S. 25 and
21. Grove, 490 F.2d at 247 ("[u]seful as the step transaction doctrine may be ... it cannot
generate events which never took place just so an additional tax liability might be asserted")
(quoting Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972, 978 (1966)). See also Esmark, Inc. v. Comm'r,
90 T.C. 171, 196-97 (1988) (same); Greene v. United States., 13 F.3d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Of
course, the [step transaction] doctrine cannot manufacture facts that never occurred to create an
otherwise non-existent tax liability").
22. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Courts have developed
three tests for determining when the step transaction doctrine should operate to collapse the
individual steps of a complex transaction into a single integrated transaction for tax purposes: (1)
end result, (2) interdependence, and (3) binding commitment"); Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169,
1175 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The commentators have attempted to synthesize from judicial decisions
several tests to determine whether the step transaction doctrine is applicable to a particular set of
circumstances in order to combine a series of steps into one transaction for tax purposes");
McDonald's Rests. of Ill. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Redding, 630 F.2d
at 1177.); Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1983); Komfeld v.
Comm'r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998) aff'g 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 1062 (1996);Long Term
Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 191 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing Associated
Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991)); Andantech L.L.C.,
83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *99 (citing Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428-30 (1987)).
23. For an early discussion, see Marvin A. Chirelstein & Benjamin B. Lopata, Recent
Developments in the Step-Transaction Doctrine, 60 TAXES 970, 970-75 (1982). See also Oliver C.
Murray, Jr., Note, Step Transactions, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv. 60 (1969); Richard D. Hobbet, The Step
Transaction Doctrine and Its Effect on Corporate Transactions, 19 TUL. TAX INST. 102 (1970).
24. See generally, Yoram Keinan, The Many Faces of the Economic Substance's Two-Prong
Test: Time for Reconciliation? I N.Y.U. J. BUS. & LAW, 372 (2005).
25. 190 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 1999).
20071
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Associated Wholesale Grocers v. U.S. 26), the step transaction principle
had served as the IRS's primary weapon against the taxpayer,27 in recent
years, the principle has became the IRS's secondary (or alternative)
argument to the more general economic substance doctrine.28 The main
reason for this trend, in my view, is that it is harder for the IRS to prevail
on the step transaction argument as opposed to the more general
economic substance/business purpose test. As I conclude below, in
cases where the transaction can be challenged on both grounds, it is very
unlikely that the IRS will use the step transaction principle as the
primary weapon.
Thus, as this article will conclude, the role of the step transaction
doctrine has been diminishing over the years from a primary weapon
against tax shelters into an alternative test. In order to revive its role, the
step transaction principle could be codified. As opposed to the
controversial proposed codification of the economic substance doctrine,
in my view, the codification of the step transaction principle will be
more acceptable. The last part of this article sets forth a basic proposal
for such codification.
This article will continue as follows. The first part discusses the
fundamentals of the general principle of substance-over-form from
which the step transaction doctrine (as well as other common law anti-
abuse rules) has emerged. The second part sets forth the building blocks
of the step transaction doctrine and its application in practice. Part III
26. 927F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1991).
27. See, e.g., Del Commer. Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1183 (1999), affd, 251
F.3d 210, 213. (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1521, where
the Court, characterizing the IRS's position, stated:
The government urges this court to disregard Elder, Inc.'s transitory ownership of
Weston by applying the step transaction doctrine in holding that the merger and
reorganization 'should be collapsed and viewed as a single transaction for tax purposes.'
The district court agreed and 'viewed the execution of the two integrated agreements as
one transaction which did not effect a bona fide sale of stock and concluded, as a matter
of law, that Super Market Developers, at all relevant times, owned more than 80 percent
of the outstanding shares of Weston....
Id.
28. See, e.g., Transcapital Leasing Assocs. 1990-11, L.P. v. United States, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16238, at 38 (W.D. Tex. 2006)).
The Government's second alternative theory applies the "step transaction doctrine" to
collapse each discrete step of the 1991 Mainframe Investment and reallocate the
"$11,518,795 of rental income reported by TransCapital Leasing Associates 1990-1I in
its year ended August 31, 1991 ... [to] Bancor... because the transactions that
produced the rental income were an interrelated series of transactions designed to shift
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elaborates on the three alternative threshold tests that courts have
developed over the years pertaining to the step transaction doctrine. Part
IV discusses another important element in determining whether the
doctrine should apply to a given transaction-the lapse of time between
each step. The fifth part discusses the main controversial element of the
step transaction doctrine, which is whether the IRS can prevail in a step
transaction case where each step in the disputed transaction has
economic substance and business purpose. Three recent cases in which
the step transaction doctrine was only used by the IRS as an alternative
weapon are discussed in Part VI to emphasize my point that the
doctrine's role has diminished over the years. Part VII sets forth a
proposal to codify the step transaction doctrine in accordance with
existing case law. Finally, Part VII contains my conclusions.
I. SUBSTANCE-OVER-FORM
The substance over form doctrine originated in Gregory v.
Helvering,29 and the Supreme Court soon thereafter articulated that:
"The incident of taxation depends on the substance rather than form of
the transaction. '30  Thus, the Supreme Court established that the
substance rather than the form of a transaction ought to govern in
determining the tax consequences of the transaction.31 In Saviano v.
Comm 'r, the Seventh Circuit elaborated that:
[t]he freedom to arrange one's affairs to minimize taxes does not
include the right to engage in financial fantasies with the expectation
that the Internal Revenue Service and the courts will play along. The
Commissioner and the courts are empowered, are in fact duty-bound,
29. 293 U.S. 465 (1935), affg 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
30. Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). See also True v. United States,
190 F.3d 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that substance over form is a "fundamental tax
principle," and applies to "look beyond the taxpayers' characterization" of the challenged business
transactions); Kornfeld v. Comm'r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 1998) ("the taxation scheme set
out in the Internal Revenue Code is complicated and the tax consequences of many transactions
depend on form, how the transaction is structured," but at the same time, the "incidence of taxation
depends on the substance of a transaction") (quoting Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. at 334); Kuper v.
Comm'r, 533 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1976); Derr v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 708, 722 (1981) ("It is now
well established that the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of the transaction and not
the mere form, where the form is not imbued with economic reality"); Leahy v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.
56, 71 (1986) ("[Ilt is well established that the economic substance of a transaction, rather than its
form, controls for Federal income tax purposes... [W]e must be concerned with the economic
realities and not the form employed by the parties"); Rev. Rul. 2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 760 ("The
substance of a transaction, not its form, governs its tax treatment").
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to look behind the contrived forms of transactions to their economic
substance and to apply the tax laws accordingly.
32
Courts have applied the substance-over-form doctrine since
Gregory v. Helvering to disallow tax benefits arising out of transactions
the forms of which have differed from their substance. 33 The substance-
over-form doctrine is triggered, therefore, only when the transaction's
substance actually differs from its form.
34
The substance-over-form doctrine is viewed as the most general
common law doctrine from which the other four doctrines have
emerged.35 As the Tax Court indicated in Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm 'r.
(See discussion infra): "Substance over form and related judicial
doctrines all require a searching analysis of the facts to see whether the
true substance of the transaction is different from its form or whether the
form reflects what actually happened.,
36
Under the substance-over-form doctrine, a court has the power to
re-characterize a transaction in accordance with its true substance if such
substance is demonstrably contrary to its outward form.37 The effect of
such a determination is generally to produce a different tax result than
the result that the form of the transaction would produce.38
As the Fifth Circuit stated in Crenshaw v. U.S.:
[Taxpayers] cannot compel a court to characterize the transaction
32. Saviano v. Comm'r, 765 F.2d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'g 80 T.C. 955 (1983).
33. See, e.g., Comm'r v. CM Holdings, 301 F.3d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the
rationale behind Gregory and its progeny is that "courts should not elevate form over substance by
rewarding taxpayers who have engaged in transactions that lack any purpose save that of tax
savings. The taxpayer has the burden of showing that the form of the transaction accurately reflects
its substance, and the deductions are permissible.").
34. See, e.g., Tracinda Corp. v. Comm'r, Ill T.C. 315, 326 (1998) ("... in order to apply
either the substance-over-form doctrine or the step-transaction doctrine, we must determine that the
substance of the transaction differs from its form").
35. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1521 (10th Cir.
1991) ("The step-transaction doctrine developed as part of the broader tax concept that substance
should prevail over form."); see also Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Comm'r, 820 F.2d 1543,
1549 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The economic substance factor involves a broader examination of whether
the substance of a transaction reflects its form, and whether from an objective standpoint the
transaction was likely to produce economic benefits aside from a tax deduction").
36. Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *89 (2002) (quoting Harris v.
Comm'r, 61 T.C. 770, 783 (1974)).
37. United States. v. Ingalls, 399 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1968) ("This court has.. .repeatedly
looked to the substance of transactions rather than to their form").
38. Id. Notable examples are all debt versus equity cases, where a court may re-characterize
debt as equity for tax purposes, and, accordingly, deny deductions for "interest" payable on the debt.
See Laidlaw Transp., Inc. v. Comm'r, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2598, *57-58 (1998) (discussing several
nonexclusive factors used to determine whether advances should be characterized as debt or equity).
[22:45
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solely upon the basis of a concentration on one facet of it when the
totality of circumstances determines its tax status. The most obvious
answer to Taxpayer's argument that the parties' characterization is
conclusive is that such a result would completely thwart the
Congressional policy to tax transactional realities rather than verbal
labels... Otherwise, form, rather than substance, would invariably
prevail. 39
Substance over form is generally raised by the Commissioner when
the taxpayer chooses a form that not only differs from the substance of
the transaction, but also a form that provides the taxpayer with a tax
benefit, to which the taxpayer would normally not be eligible if the form
is consistent with the substance.40 In its report on tax shelters in 1999,
the U.S. Department of the Treasury indicated:
Generally, the tax results arising from a transaction (or series of
transactions) are obvious, uncontroverted, and based on the 'form' of
the transactions the taxpayer has chosen. In some rare (but important)
cases, however, the "substance" of a particular transaction produces
tax results that are inconsistent with its "form" as embodied in its
underlying documentation .... Under the substance-over-form
doctrine, the IRS and the courts may recharacterize a transaction in
accordance with its substance, if the substance of the transaction is
demonstrably contrary to the form.
4 1
The transaction's form, however, may not be easily ignored.42
Applying the standard of Frank Lyon v. U.S.,43 the Second Circuit
indicated in Newman v. Comm 'r that relevant criteria in determining
whether a transaction's form ought to be respected include: (i) the
existence of a business purpose; (ii) whether the transaction has changed
the parties' economic interests; (iii) whether the transaction's terms were
arm's-length terms; and (iv) did the parties respect their own form.44
39. 450 F.2d 472, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. Keeler v. Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) ("In inquiring whether
taxpayer's deductions were properly disallowed, we look past the form of the transactions at issue
and examine their substance.").
41. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
DISCUSSION ANALYSIS, AND LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 46-47 (1999),
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/ctswhite.pdf).
42. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978) ("In applying the doctrine of
substance over form, the Court has looked to the objective economic realities of a transaction rather
than to the particular form the parties employed").
43. Id. at 561-62 (1978) (creating the two prong test). See generally, Yoram Keinan, The
Many Faces of the Economic Substance's Two-Prong Test: Time for Reconciliation? I N.Y.U. J.
BUS. & LAW, 372 (2005).
44. Newman v. Comm'r, 902 F.2d 159, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Thus, the Second Circuit indicated that the form will not be disregarded
simply because the substance may differ from the transaction's form. 5
Nevertheless, taxpayers have found it very difficult to successfully
invoke common law anti-abuse doctrines to challenge their own
transaction form.46 In only a few cases, taxpayers have succeeded in
challenging their own form;4 7 a court will not easily allow the taxpayer
to disavow his or her own form, even if it is evident that the form differs
from the transaction's substance. 4
Courts are divided, however, over the required standard for the
taxpayer to be eligible to disavow its own form.4 9 While several circuits
as well as the Tax Court allow a taxpayer to disavow its own form if the
taxpayer shows "strong proof' to support its alternative form,50 the Third
Circuit set forth a stricter standard in Comm'r. v. Danielson.51 Under
what has become known as the "Danielson" standard, a taxpayer is
permitted to disavow its own form only by proving that the contract
between the parties should be disregarded on the grounds of mistake,
fraud, undue influence or similar grounds. 2 The latter standard has been
adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh and Federal Circuits. 3 Finally, the
45. Id. at 163 ("While we exalt substance over form, we do not ignore the form.").
46. Estate of Rogers v. Comm'r, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 869, *13-15 (1970) affd per curiam, 445
F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1971); Halstead v. Comm'r, 296 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1961); Spector v. Comm'r,
641 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 1981); Bradley v. United States, 730 F.2d 718, 720 (1lth Cir. 1984);
Maletis v. United States 200 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1952); MAS One L.P. v. United States, 390 F.3d 427
(6th Cir. 2004). Cf. Comdisco v. United States, 756 F.2d 569, 578 (7th Cir. 1985).
47. See, e.g., Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939); Estate of Weinert v.
Comm'r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961); Ill. Power Com. v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1417 (1986);
Pacific Gamble Robinson v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 915, *27 (1987).
48. Stokely-Van Camp v. United States, 974 F.2d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[G]enerally,
a taxpayer may not disregard the terms of a contract allocating the payment thereunder and adopt a
different allocation having more favorable tax consequences.").
49. Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319, 322 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Although recognizing that
the Tax Court has rejected the Danielson rule, see, e.g., Weiner v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 155, 159-60
(1973), we conclude that the Danielson approach is sounder.").
50. Schultz, 294 F.2d at 55 (quoting Ullman v. Comm'r, 264 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1959)).
See also Kreider v. Comm'r, 762 F.2d 580, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1985); Major v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 239,
249 (1981).
51. Comm'r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967). For an in-depth discussion on
the "Danielson" doctrine, see generally Christian A. Johnson, The Danielson Rule: An Anodyne for
the Pain of Reasoning, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1320 (1989).
52. Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775 ("a party can challenge the tax consequences of his agreement
as construed by the Commissioner only by adducing proof which in an action between the parties to
the agreement would be admissible to alter that construction or to show its unenforceability because
of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc.").
53. See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, 730 F.2d 718, 720 (11 th Cir. 1984) ("Taxpayers have
failed to submit any evidence to prove the existence of a mistake, undue influence, fraud, or duress
so as to merit release from the transaction form that they employed"); Schatten, 746 F.2d at 322
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First Circuit has tended to avoid the Danielson standard but also has not
adopted the "strong proof' standard. 4 Although the Tax Court generally
follows the "strong proof' standard,55 a Tax Court might be obligated to
follow the stricter Danielson standard if an appeal from the court would
be made to a Circuit that applies Danielson.
5 6
II. OVERVIEW OF THE STEP TRANSACTION PRINCIPLE
The step transaction principle is a variation on the substance-over-
from doctrine, the purpose of which is to ensure that transactions are
taxed according to their substance and not their outward form. 7
("For three reasons, we agree with the Third and Fifth Circuits that a party may not challenge the
tax consequences of a settlement agreement absent 'proof which in an action between the parties to
the agreement would be admissible to alter the construction or to show its unenforceability because
of mistake, undue influence, fraud or duress."'); Spector v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 376, 384-85 (5th Cir.
1981) ("At the outset, we note that several policy considerations argue for application of the
Danielson rule [to this case]").
54. Leslie S. Ray Ins. Agency, Inc. v. United States, 463 F.2d 210, 211-12 (lst Cir. 1972)
("We need not, however, choose between Danielson and the view of the circuits which do not
follow it."); Harvey Radio Laboratories, Inc. v. Comm'r, 470 F.2d 118, 120 (1st Cir. 1972) ("While
at its core Danielson, like Leslie Ray, is a rule of intent, we presently see no reason for pushing to
the extreme of that rule, or indeed, in determining the degree of difference. Perhaps if a taxpayer
can show an ancillary agreement to support his tax treatment, then the sales agreement should not be
binding. At any rate, we are not faced with that situation.").
55. See, e.g., Elrod v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1046, 1066 (1986) (noting that the Tax Court has not
adopted the Danielson rule set forth by the Third Circuit, and that "Inasmuch as this case would be
appealable to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, we are not bound to apply this rule in the
instant case.... The strong proof rule is a standard applied by this Court.").
56. See, e.g., Deve. Corp. of America v. Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 455, *85 (1988)
("[W]hile we still adhere to our 'strong proof standard, we are bound to apply the Danielson rule in
the instant case.").
57. Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989). ("Under [the step transaction] doctrine,
interrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated transaction may not be considered
independently of the overall transaction."); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States,
927 F.2d 1517, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States,
399 F.2d 194, 207, 185 Ct. Cl. 161 (1968)) ("The [step transaction] doctrine is part of the broader
tax concept that substance should prevail over form."); Kanawha Gas & Util's Co. v. Comm'r, 214
F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954) ("[substance-over-form] is particularly pertinent to cases involving a
series of transactions designed and executed as parts of a unitary plan to achieve an intended result.
Such plans will be viewed as a whole regardless of whether the effect of so doing is imposition of or
relief from taxation. The series of closely related steps in such a plan are merely the means by which
to carry out the plan and will not be separated"); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at
1521 ("The step- transaction doctrine developed as part of the broader tax concept that substance
should prevail over form."); True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting
that the step transaction doctrine is an "incarnation of the basic substance over form principle");
Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1244 ("The step transaction doctrine is a corollary of the general
tax principle that the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction rather than
its form"); Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1994) ("By emphasizing substance
over form, the step transaction doctrine prevents a taxpayer from escaping taxation. The doctrine
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Accordingly, a court will not apply the step transaction doctrine if the
substance of the transaction does not differ from its form.58
In Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, a corporation was organized and its
stock was immediately distributed to its shareholders.5 9 Immediately
thereafter, the corporation acquired stock of another company and
cash. 60  The cash was immediately distributed to the corporation's
shareholders pursuant to a plan of reorganization that required the
shareholders to assume the corporation's debts.6' The United States
Supreme Court established the step transaction principle and held that:
In pursuance of the resolution, the stockholders received the money
from petitioner to the extent of $106,471.73, not as a distribution for
their benefit but as a fund the equivalent of which they were bound to
pass on, and did pass on, to the creditors. The conclusion is
inescapable, as the court below very clearly pointed out, that by this
roundabout process petitioner received the same benefit "as though it
had retained that amount from distribution and applied it to the
payment of such indebtedness." Payment of indebtedness, and not
distribution of dividends, was, from the beginning, the aim of the
understanding with the stockholders and was the end accomplished by
carrying that understanding into effect. A given result at the end of a
straight path is not made a different result because reached by
following a devious path. The preliminary distribution to the
stockholders was a meaningless and unnecessary incident in the
transmission of the fund to the creditors, all along intended to come to
their hands, so transparently artificial that further discussion would be
a needless waste of time. The relation of the stockholders to the matter
was that of a mere conduit. The controlling principle will be found in
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-470; and applying that
treats the 'steps' in a series of formally separate but related transactions involving the transfer of
property as a single transaction, if all the steps are substantially linked"); Penrod v. Comm'r, 88
T.C. 1415, 1428-29 (1987) ("The step transaction doctrine is in effect another rule of substance over
form; it treats a series of formally separate 'steps' as a single transaction if such steps are in
substance integrated, interdependent, and focused toward a particular result"); Teong-Chan Gaw v.
Comm'r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1196, *124 (1995) ("The step transaction doctrine developed from the
substance over form doctrine") (citing Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1521).
58. MAS One L.P. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (S.D. Ohio 2003), aff'd,
MAS One L.P. v. United States, 390 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The step transaction doctrine is
inapplicable in this case because the substance and the form of the transactions in question do not
differ in any meaningful way"); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Comm'r, 111 T.C. 315, 326
(1998) ("... in order to apply either the substance-over-form doctrine or the step-transaction
doctrine, we must determine that the substance of the transaction differs from its form.").
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principle here, the judgment of the court below is Affirmed.62
Under the step transaction doctrine, separate transactions or steps
may be treated as a single, unified transaction for tax purposes. 63 Courts
apply the step transaction doctrine in cases where taxing the individual
steps of a transaction rather than the transaction as a whole would
eviscerate the substance of the transaction resulting in improper tax
treatment of the whole transaction.64 As a result, such individual steps
would be disregarded for tax purposes, and the transaction will be taxed
as a single unified transaction as opposed to separate steps.65
In Smith v. Comm 'r,66 the Tax Court illustrated the application of
the doctrine:
The step transaction doctrine generally applies in cases where a
taxpayer seeks to get from point A to point D and does so stopping in
between at points B and C. The whole purpose of the unnecessary
stops is to achieve tax consequences differing from those which a
direct path from A to D would have produced. In such a situation,
courts are not bound by the twisted path taken by the taxpayer, and the
intervening stops may be disregarded or rearranged. [Citation
omitted.]6
The step transaction doctrine is frequently raised by the IRS in
62. Id. at 613-14.
63. D'Angelo Assoc., Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 121, 129 (1978) ("Where a series of closely
related steps are taken pursuant to a plan to achieve an intended result, the transaction must be
viewed as an integrated whole for tax purposes."). See also Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83
T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *98 (2002).
64. Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[A]
particular step in a transaction is disregarded for tax purposes if the taxpayer could have achieved its
objective more directly, but instead included the step for no other purpose than to avoid U.S.
taxes."); Grove, 490 F.2d at 246 (the step transaction doctrine applies to "meaningless intervening
steps in a single, integrated transaction designed to avoid tax liability by the use of mere
formalisms.").
65. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 658 (5th Cir. 1968) ("[A] tax-free
exchange cannot be transformed into two sales by the arbitrary separation of time and exchange of
cash"). See also Donald L. Korb, IRS Chief Counsel Offers Historical Overview of Shelters, Tax
Notes Today, Feb. 11, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 29-61.
A business transaction often does not have a sharply defined beginning or ending. One
step in a transactional sequence often bears a strong relationship to that which came
before it and that which follows it. For analytical purposes, however, it is often necessary
to examine a transaction as an organic whole. To that end, the IRS and courts often fuse
formally separate transactional steps to determine the tax consequences of the overall
transaction.
Id.
66. 78 T.C. 350 (1982).
67. Id. at 389. See also Andantech L.L.C., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *97 (quoting Smith v.
Comm'r, 78 T.C. 350, 389 (1982)).
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cases of transfers of property.68 In Greene v. U.S., the taxpayers formed
a tax-exempt private foundation in the early 1970s. 69  From 1974 to
1980, the taxpayers donated futures contracts to the institute and
reported on their tax returns charitable contributions equal to the fair
market value of the contracts at the time when they were donated.7°
The effect of the 1981 enactment of I.R.C. §§125671 and 17072 on
the taxpayers was that if "they would continue donating their entire
interest in futures contracts to the Institute, they would only be entitled
to claim a charitable deduction for 60 percent of the contracts' fair
market value-the amount equal to the long-term gain portion." 73 To
avoid this result, the taxpayers changed the manner in which they made
their contributions and conveyed only the "right, title and interest in the
long term capital gain of the futures contracts" to the Institute,
specifically retaining the short-term capital gain.74 The contracts were
then transferred to a special account held with Merrill Lynch over which
and were sold the same day or shortly after each gift was made.75 "The
part of the proceeds representing the long-term capital gains was
transferred to the Institute's account, and the part representing the short-
term capital gains was transferred to [taxpayer's] personal account. ' 76
The taxpayers' reported and paid income taxes on the short-term capital
gains and took a deduction for their charitable donation of the long-term
capital.77
The government argued that under the step transaction doctrine, the
taxpayers' donation of appreciated futures contracts should be
disregarded, and the transaction should be treated as a sale by the
taxpayers of the contracts followed by a gift of a portion of the cash
proceeds to the tax-exempt foundation.78 The Second Circuit applied the
end result and interdependence test (two of the three alternative tests,
68. See, e.g., Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1520 (10th
Cir. 1991).
69. Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1994).
70. Id.
71. I.R.C. § 1256(a) (West 1988). Congress amended § 1256 in order "to combat perceived
tax abuses by commodities traders..." Greene, 13 F.3d at 579.
72. § 170(e)(1). According to the Greene Court, "[s]ection 170 of the Code does not permit a
charitable donation deduction for the value of donated property that would have been a short-term
gain to the taxpayer had the taxpayer sold the property." Greene, 13 F.3d at 579.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 579-80.
75. Id. at 580.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 583.
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which are discussed in greater detail below), and disagreed with the
Government. 79 The Second Circuit first indicated that:
[t]he doctrine treats the steps in a series of formally separate but related
transactions involving the transfer of property as a single transaction, if
all the steps are substantially linked. Rather than viewing each step as
an isolated incident, the steps are viewed together as components of an
overall plan.
80
Once a court determines that applying the step transaction to the
particular case is appropriate, it can either: (i) disregard transactions or
steps in a transaction that it believes are unnecessary; 81 or (ii) change the
order of such transaction or steps. 82 In most cases, the former action is
made, and several transactions or steps are integrated into a single
transaction.83
Nevertheless, as many courts have indicated, the IRS may not
"generate events which never took place just so an additional tax
liability might be asserted. 84  In Long Term Capital Holding (See
79. Id. at 583-85. The Second Circuit, however, found that the end result test was
inapplicable because it found no evidence that a prearranged plan to dispose of the futures contract
existed at the time of donation. Id. at 583. In addition, the Second Circuit found that the two steps
were independent from each other. Id. at 583-84. Thus, the Second Circuit held for the taxpayer.
Id. at 584.
80. Id. at 583 (internal citation omitted).
81. Andantech L.L.C.v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *97 (2002).
82. Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). ("To permit the true nature of a
transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would
seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress.").
83. See, e.g., Andantech L.L.C., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *99. See also Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Strike Allegations in Counts One Through Forty of the
Indictment, Pursuant to Rule 7(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, United States v.
Jeffrey Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 888, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28166 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 15, 2005), available
at 2006 WL 1868180.
Under the "step transaction" doctrine, the government may try to telescope various steps
of a transaction, combining them into one so as to achieve tax consequences that are
more favorable to the government. It must be able to reach the same result as the original
transaction, however, and, in so doing, may not posit even the same number of, but
different, "steps" to reach the same result via a different means from that of the taxpayer;
the government must reach that result in fewer steps.
Id. (emphasis in original).
84. Grove v. Comm'r, 490 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[u]seful as the step transaction
doctrine may be ... it cannot generate events which never took place just so an additional tax
liability might be asserted") (quoting Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972, 978 (1966)). See
also Esmark, Inc. v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 171, 196-97 (1988) (same); Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d
577, 583 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Of course, the [step transaction] doctrine cannot manufacture facts that
never occurred to create an otherwise non-existent tax liability"); 11 JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 43:226, at 361 (2005) ("While a recharacterization may
combine steps [in a transaction], it may not reach a different result or invent new steps").
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discussion in greater detail infra), the court explained that:
Grove and Greene stand for the unstartling proposition that, absent
clear error in a trial court's finding that the transacting parties did not
informally agree to or prearrange various steps of an overall plan, or
where it determines on summary judgment that there is no evidence
that the transacting parties did so, an appellate court will not overturn
that finding/determination in favor of rejected findings of fact or a
position for which there is no evidence. In such cases, the
Government's re-characterization is unsubstantiated fiction and does
not reflect the substance of what the evidence fairly shows occurred.
85
Thus, as the Government recently indicated in a Coordinated Issue
Paper, "as a general rule, courts have held that in order to collapse a
transaction, the Government must have a logically plausible alternative
explanation that accounts for all the results of the transaction.'
86
Because the step transaction doctrine is a variation of the substance-
over-form doctrine, courts have generally held that the taxpayer's ability
to invoke the step transaction doctrine by challenging its own transaction
steps is limited, in accordance with the Danielson or "strong proof'
standards discussed above. 87 Nevertheless, although in most cases the
Government raises the step transaction doctrine to disallow tax benefits,
several courts have held that the taxpayer is allowed to use the doctrine
as well.88 In MAS One Limited Partnership v. U.S. (See discussion in
greater detail below), the court held that, "the step transaction doctrine is
not merely a method preventing tax avoidance, but can also be used for a
taxpayer's benefit."
8 9
85. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 194-95 (D. Conn.
2004). See also Transcapital Leasing Assocs. 1990-11, L.P. v. United States, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16238, at 42 (W.D. Tex. 2006)).
The Government's theory would require the Court to disregard TCLA 1990-II's pre-
August 31, 1991 form and find Bancor, a non-partner at that time, to be a putative
partner, by collapsing each of the 1991 Mainframe Investment's transactions in a single
transaction. The Court's jurisdiction does not extend so far. The Court cannot
"fictionally," for tax purposes only, make Bancor a partner in a partnership in which it
was not a partner. As of August 31, 1991, Bancor had no interest in TCLA 1990-I1.
Id.
86. Internal Revenue Service, Coordinated Issue Paper Addresses Partnership Straddle Tax
Shelters, Tax Notes Today, May 9, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 91-27 (citing Del Commercial Props.,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428-30
(1987); Tracinda Corp. v. Comm'r, 111 T.C. 315, 327 (1998).
87. Estate of Durkin v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 561, 571-73 (1992).
88. South Bay Corp. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1965) ("The 'step analysis' of
transactions does not operate in terms of an estoppel of taxpayers to deny the forms of their
transactions but in terms of the reality of the transactions").
89. MAS One L.P. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067 (S.D. Ohio 2003), aff'd,
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In conclusion, there are two prerequisites for applying the step
transaction doctrine: (i) the substance of the transaction must differ from
the form; and (ii) such a difference has to be viewed as abusive for tax
purposes. For this reason, and as discussed in greater detail below, the
IRS has found it harder to challenge transactions under the step
transaction doctrine and has been using this route only as an alternative
argument in several recent cases.
III. THE THREE ALTERNATIVE THRESHOLD TESTS
Applying the step transaction principle to a set of steps or
transactions is not an easy task.90 Thus, as the Tax Court indicated, "The
step-transaction doctrine remains a somewhat elusive principle.
However, there have been attempts to establish some sort of coherence
as to the manner in which it is applied."91 In attempts to bring some
uniformity, the courts have articulated three different threshold tests
(each of which is discussed in greater detail below) for determining
when it is appropriate to apply the step transaction doctrine:
" the "binding commitment" test;
* the "end result test;" and
* the "mutual interdependence" test.
92
Nevertheless, because the step transaction principle is a common
law creature, its application still remains open to various
MAS One L.P. v. United States, 390 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S.
726, 738 (1989)) ("applying the step transaction doctrine to reject the 'counterintuitive conclusion
urged by the Commissioner.').
90. King Enters. Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511,516 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("[W]hether to accord
the separate steps of a complex transaction independent significance, or to treat them as related
steps in a unified transaction, is a recurring problem in the field of tax law"). See generally
Seymour S. Mintz & William T. Plumb, Jr., Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12
N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 247 (1954).
91. Weikel v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 432, *26 (1986).
92. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1999) ("Courts have developed
three tests for determining when the step transaction doctrine should operate to collapse the
individual steps of a complex transaction into a single integrated transaction for tax purposes: (1)
end result, (2) interdependence, and (3) binding commitment"); Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169,
1175 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The commentators have attempted to synthesize from judicial decisions
several tests to determine whether the step transaction doctrine is applicable to a particular set of
circumstances in order to combine a series of steps into one transaction for tax purposes");
McDonald's Rests. of Ill. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Redding, 688 F.2d
at 1175 ); Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States., 702 F.2d 1234, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1983); Kornfeld
v. Comm'r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998); Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States,
330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 191 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United
States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991)); Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH)
1476, *99-100 (2002) (citing Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428-30 (1987)).
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interpretations. 93  Frequently, courts applying the step transaction
doctrine have applied more than one of these three tests.94 Some courts
have determined that the Government can satisfy any of the above
standards tests in order for the step transaction doctrine to operate. 95 As
I conclude below, the step transaction test as a practical matter is a two-
prong test.
In Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, between
1976 and 1980, Super Market Developers, Inc. acquired approximately
99.97 percent of the stock of Weston Investment Co. ("Weston"), a
publicly traded holding company.96 The management of Super Market
Developer's parent corporation, Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc.,
subsequently decided it was not in their best interests to own and operate
grocery stores through subsidiary corporations. 97  "One of Weston's
subsidiaries was Weston Market, Inc., a grocery managed by Thomas
Elder., 98  "In 1980, Mr. Elder expressed to taxpayer his interest in
buying Weston Market." 99  The parties structured a disposition of
Weston's stock in the form of two agreements between Super Market
93. See, e.g., Redding, 630 F.2d at 1175 ("Unfortunately, these tests are notably abstruse-even
for such an abstruse field as tax law. And we must bear in mind, in applying the "tests" that "(t)he
step transaction doctrine is only a judicial device expressing the familiar principle that in applying
the income tax laws, the substance rather than the form of the transaction is controlling") (quoting
Taxation of Stock Rights, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 146, 157 (1963)). See also 11 JACOB MERTENS, JR.,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 43:226, at 359-60 (2005) ("tests used in applying the
step transaction doctrine vary depending on the circumstances and have been described as 'notably
abstruse."' )(citing Redding, 630 F.2d at 1175).
94. See, e.g., True, 190 F.3d at 1175 ("More than one test might be appropriate under any
given set of circumstances"). See also Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 583-85 (2d Cir. 1994)
(applying the end result and interdependence tests and holding that under both tests, the step
transaction should not apply); see also Andantech L.L.C., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *112 (applying the
end result and interdependence tests and holding that under either test, the steps should be collapsed
into a single transaction).
95. See Andantech L.L.C., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *99-100 (citing Associated Wholesale
Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1527-28). See also Long Term Capital Holding, 330 F. Supp 2d at 191,
where the government contended that under either the end result test or the interdependence test, a
taxpayer's contributions of preferred stock to a partnerhsip in exchange for a partnership interest
and the taxpayer's subsequent sale of that partnership interest to a third party must be stepped
together into a single sale transaction with the result that the third party acquired the preferred stock,
rather than the partnership interest, for a cost basis pursuant to I.R.C. § 1012.) The Court agreed that
this result followed from application of the end result test and therefore did not undertake an
application of the interdependence test. Id. Cf Redding, 630 F.2d at 1178 ("[T]he lack of 'binding
commitment' is simply one factor to which we give appropriate consideration here. Certainly, it is
not necessary for us to rely on this factor to reach our result").
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Developers and Elder Food Mart, Inc. ("Elder, Inc."), "a corporation
organized by Mr. Elder to facilitate the purchase of Weston Market."100
"Both agreements were signed on December 11, 1980, and
consummated on December 23, 19 8 0 . ' '
"Under the 'Agreement and Plan of Merger,' Weston was merged
into Elder, Inc., with Elder, Inc. as the surviving corporation. 1 0 2 "Under
the 'Agreement and Plan of Reorganization,' which took effect
'immediately following the time of effectiveness of the merger', Super
Market Developers bought back all the assets acquired by Elder, Inc.
under the merger agreement except for the stock of Weston Market."' 3
The taxpayer treated the transaction as a taxable sale of Weston's assets
and declared a tax loss under I.R.C. § 1001(a) 10 4 in its 1980 consolidated
federal income tax return and sought to carry back portions of the loss to
each of the three prior years. 10 5  "The IRS denied the loss, concluding
the transaction was not a sale but rather a complete liquidation of
taxpayer's subsidiary, Weston."' 10 6  "As such, the IRS concluded,
recognition of the loss was barred by section 332. ' 'I °7
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. "Elder, Inc. exchanged $300,000 in cash and a non-interest bearing demand
promissory note, with a face value of $9,049,703, for the Weston stock." Id. "The minority
shareholders were entitled to receive $28.50 per share, or more, depending on their pro rata share of
the cash and note exchanged for Weston stock." Id.
103. Id. at 1518-1519. "In exchange for those assets, Super Market Developers paid 'an
amount equal to the principal amount of the promissory note.. . plus an amount equal to the cash
received by the [minority] shareholders."' Id. at 1519.
104. I.R.C. § 1001 (West 1989). Determination of amount of and recognition of gain or loss
(a) Computation of gain or loss
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount
realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for determining gain,
and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section for
determining loss over the amount realized.
(c) Recognition of gain or loss
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the entire amount of the gain or loss,
determined under this section, on the sale or exchange of property shall be recognized.
Id.
105. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1519 (10th Cir.
1991).
106. Id
107. Id. § 332, entitled "Complete liquidation of subsidiaries," provides:
(a) General rule
No gain or loss shall be recognized on the receipt by a corporation of property
distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation.
(b) Liquidations to which section applies
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The lower court refused to apply the end result test.10 8 The Tenth
Circuit indicated that more than one test might be appropriate under any
given set of facts but that the circumstances need satisfy only one of the
tests in order for the step transaction doctrine to operate.' 09 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit followed the lower court, focused on the interdependence
test, and held for the Government. 110
Other courts have articulated that satisfying only one of the
alternative tests may not be enough for the government."' Frequently,
courts conclude that more than one of the alternative tests should be
satisfied in determining whether the steps ought to be collapsed under
the step transaction doctrine." 1
2
A. The Binding-Commitment Test
The "binding commitment" test was introduced by the Supreme
Court in Comm 'r v. Gordon.'1 3 The transaction in Gordon took place in
(1) the corporation receiving such property was, on the date of the adoption of the plan
of liquidation, and has continued to be at all times until the receipt of the property, the
owner of stock (in such other corporation) possessing at least 80 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and the owner of at least
80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock (except nonvoting
stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends); and either
(2) the distribution is by such other corporation in complete cancellation or redemption
of all its stock, and the transfer of all the property occurs within the taxable year; in such
case the adoption by the shareholders of the resolution under which is authorized the
distribution of all the assets of such corporation in complete cancellation or redemption
of all its stock shall be considered an adoption of a plan of liquidation, even though no
time for the completion of the transfer of the property is specified in such resolution; or
(3) such distribution is one of a series of distributions by such other corporation in
complete cancellation or redemption of all its stock in accordance with a plan of
liquidation under which the transfer of all the property under the liquidation is to be
completed within 3 years from the close of the taxable year during which is made the
first of the series of distributions under the plan, except that if such transfer is not
completed within such period, or if the taxpayer does not continue qualified under
paragraph (1) until the completion of such transfer, no distribution under the plan shall
be considered a distribution in complete liquidation.
Id. (2007).
108. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1519.
109. Id. at 1527-28 (finding end result test inappropriate under the particular circumstances of
case, but applying the step transaction doctrine using the interdependence test).
110. Id. at 1527-30.
Ill. See, e.g., Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169, 1178 (1980) ("[T]he lack of 'binding
commitment' is simply one factor to which we give appropriate consideration here. Certainly, it is
not necessary for us to rely on this factor to reach our result.").
112. See Andantech L.L.C., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *112 (applying both the end result and
interdependence tests).
113. Comm'r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 97 (1968). In Gordon, the Supreme Court "refused to
apply step transaction analysis to a multi-year series of stock transfers in the absence of a 'binding
[22:45
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two steps. In 1961, in pursuance of a plan to divide a subsidiary of
American Telephone and Telegraph Company into two entities,
shareholders of the subsidiary received the right to purchase at a price
below the fair market value common stock in the new subsidiary. When
the rights were granted, the stock of the new subsidiary was owned by
the first subsidiary.
1 14
The total rights transferred in 1961 equaled 57 percent of the stock
in the new subsidiary. 1 5  In 1963, the remaining rights in the new
subsidiary (i.e., 43 percent of the stock) were offered to the
shareholders. 1 6  The dispute was over the question whether the
difference between the amount paid by the shareholders when they
exercised their rights and the fair market value of the new subsidiary's
stock they received was taxable to the shareholder as ordinary income,
or whether the stock distribution was tax-free or constituted a "spin-off'
under I.R.C. § 355.117
The Supreme Court held that separate steps will be collapsed into a
single transaction only if, at the time the first step takes place, the
taxpayer was under a commitment to complete the remaining steps.
1 18
Stated differently, "[i]f there were a moment in the series of the
transactions during which the parties were not under a binding
obligation, the steps cannot be collapsed under this test."'1 9 Applying
this principle, the Supreme Court held that the shareholders that
exercised their rights to purchase the new subsidiary's stock should have
recognized ordinary income equal to the difference between the amount
paid for the stock and the stock's fair market value, and that the amount
received on the sale of the rights was also taxable as ordinary income. 120
As the Tax Court indicated in Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r
commitment' to take the later steps." Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1523 n.6 (citing
Gordon, 391 U.S. at 96).
114. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. SeeI.R.C. § 355 (2007).
118. Gordon, 391 U.S. at 96 (noting that "if one transaction is to be characterized as a 'first
step' there must be a binding commitment to take the later steps."); Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.
1415, 1428-30 (1987); Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1980); McDonald's
Rests. of Ill. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1982); Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States,
702 F.2d 1234, 1244-45 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Thus the 'binding commitment' test requires telescoping
several steps into one transaction only if a binding commitment existed as to the second step at the
time the first step was taken"); Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 12, 95-100 (2003).
119. Internal Revenue Service, Coordinated Issue Paper Addresses Partnership Straddle Tax
Shelters, Tax Notes Today, May 9, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 91-27 (citing Long Term Capital
Holding v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004)).
120. Gordon, 391 U.S. at 98.
2007]
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(discussed infra), the binding commitment standard is the most rigorous
standard of the three:
The purpose of the binding commitment test is to promote certainty in
tax planning; it is the most rigorous limitation of the step transaction
doctrine. It is seldom used and is applicable only where a substantial
period of time has passed between the steps that are subject to
scrutiny.
12 1
Thus, when the steps are more closely related in time, courts may
refuse to apply the binding commitment test. 22 As indicated by the Tax
Court in Penrod v. Comm 'r, "there have been objections to [the binding
commitment] test on the ground that the result is easily manipulable by
taxpayers.123 The Fifth Circuit elaborated in Security Industrial Ins.
Co. v. U.S. that:
Subsequent decisions, however, have tended to confine Gordon [391
U.S. 83 (1961)] to its facts. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has
concluded that lack of a "binding commitment" should be
determinative only in cases involving multiyear transactions; in other
situations, the presence or absence of a "binding commitment" is
simply one factor to be considered.
124
As a result, the binding commitment test is seldom used. 125  By
121. See Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *100 (2002); Penrod, 88 T.C.
at 1429 ("The narrowest alternative is the 'binding commitment' test, under which a. series of
transactions are collapsed if, at the time the first step is entered into, there was a binding
commitment to undertake the later step"); Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1245 ("The third and
most restrictive test permitting invocation of the step transaction doctrine is the binding
commitment' test"); McDonald's Rests. ofIll., 688 F.2d at 525.
122. McDonald's Rests. of ll., 688 F.2d at 525 (noting that the binding commitment test is the
most rigorous of the three step transaction tests "because it was formulated to deal with the
characterization of a transaction that in fact spanned several tax years and could have remained 'not
only indeterminable but unfixed for an indefinite and unlimited period in the future, awaiting events
that might or might not happen."') (quoting Gordon, 391 U.S. at 96). Cf. Redding, 630 F.2d at 1178
(reasoning that the Supreme Court did not intend the failure to satisfy the binding commitment test
in circumstances involving much shorter time periods than were at issue in Gordon to automatically
preclude application of the step transaction doctrine, and concluding that the binding commitment
test is, thus, "simply one factor to which we give appropriate consideration here. Certainly, it is not
necessary for us to rely on this factor to reach our result").
123. Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1429 (quoting King Enters. Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 518
(Ct. Cl. 1969) ("the step transaction doctrine would be a dead letter if restricted to situations where
the parties were bound to take certain steps.") (emphasis in original).
124. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1245, citing McDonald's Rests. of Ill., 688 F.2d at 525;
Redding, 630 F.2d at 1178; King Enters. Inc., 418 F.2d at 517-18.
125. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1175 n.8 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The binding
commitment test is seldom utilized, and only applies to situations 'where the taxpayer is subject to
an obligation or binding commitment, at the time the first step is entered into, to pursue the
[22:45
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definition, a court applying the binding commitment test will normally
search for a formal commitment, typically in the form of an agreement
between the parties to complete the remaining steps. 126 Nevertheless,
the existence of a formal agreement is not a prerequisite; the Tax Court
has held in Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Comm'r that "[a] binding
commitment or even an agreement in principle that each step of a plan
will occur is not a prerequisite for finding that a firm and fixed plan
existed, although uncertainty regarding one or more steps of the plan is a
factor we must consider.'
27
In my view, the binding commitment test should be treated as
supporting evidence rather than one of the three primary tests. In other
words, if a binding commitment is found, this could be a strong
indication that the steps should be collapsed, but the lack of binding
commitment should not preclude the application of the step transaction
doctrine. This view is reflected in my proposed codification of the
doctrine discussed below.
B. The End-Result Test
In 1954, the Fifth Circuit held in Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v.
Comm 'r that the "end result" test:
is particularly pertinent to cases involving a series of transactions
designed and executed as parts of a unitary plan to achieve an intended
result. Such plans will be viewed as a whole regardless of whether the
effect of so doing is imposition of or relief from taxation. The series of
closely related steps in such a plan are merely the means by which to
carry out the plan and will not be separated.
128
Under this standard, separate steps will be integrated if they are a
part of a single scheme designed to achieve a single result. 129 Thus, the
successive steps in a series of transactions,' usually spanning several years.") (citing JACOB
MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 43:256 (1997)). See also Komfeld v.
Comm'r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 n.6 (1Oth Cir. 1991)).
126. Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1429.
127. Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 12, 100 (2003). See also Roebling v. Comm'r,
77 T.C. 30, 55 (1981) ("We do not believe the requirement of a firm and fixed plan for redemptions
need be as rigid under the circumstances here involved."); McDonald's Rests. ofll., 688 F.2d at
525 ("The Tax Court found the test unsatisfied because the Garb-Stem group was not legally
obliged to sell its McDonald's stock. We think it misconceived the purpose of the test and
misapplied it to the facts of this case.").
128. Kanawha Gas & Util's Co. v. Comm'r, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (1954).
129. Kornfeld, 137 F.3d at 1235; McDonald's Rests. of Ill., 688 F.2d at 524; King Enters. Inc.,
418 F.2d at 516-17. See generally Stephen Bowen, The End Result Test, 72 TAXES 722 (1994).
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end result test focuses on the taxpayer's intent at the time of the first
step. 130  As the Court of Claims indicated in King Enterprises Inc. v.
U.S., the step transaction doctrine should apply to "purportedly separate
transactions... [that] were really component parts of a single
transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of
reaching the ultimate result."'13 1 The end result test combines separate
steps or events that appear to be components of an action undertaken to
reach a particular result into a single transaction. 3 2  Accordingly, under
the end result test, if a court finds that a series of closely related steps or
events is merely the means to achieve a particular end result, it would
treat the steps as a single transaction.'
33
The end result test is the test most often invoked in connection with
the step transaction doctrine. 134  As the Tax Court indicated in
Andantech L.L. C. v. Comm 'r.:
Under the end result test, there is no independent tax recognition of the
individual steps unless the taxpayer shows that at the time the parties
engaged in the individual step, its result was the intended end result in
and of itself. .. If this is not what was intended, then we collapse the
series of steps and give tax consideration only to the intended end
result. The doctrine derives vitality, rather, from its application where
the form of a transaction does not require a particular further step be
taken; but, once taken, the substance of the transaction reveals that the
ultimate result was intended from the outset. 
135
130. Greene v. United States., 13 F.3d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Under the end result test, the
step transaction doctrine will be invoked if it appears that a series of separate transactions were
prearranged parts of what was a single transaction, cast from the outset to achieve the ultimate
result").
131. King Enters. Inc., 418 F.2d 511, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1969). See also McDonald's Rests. of ll.,
688 F.2d at 524 (citing King Enters. Inc., 418 F.2d at 516); Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169,
1175 (1980) ("the parties ask us to consider.., the 'end result' test, whereby purportedly separate
transactions will be amalgamated into a single transaction when it appears that the successive steps
were made 'in furtherance of, and for the purpose of executing and putting into effect, the plan of
reorganization."); Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing
King Enters. Inc., 418 F.2d at 516).
132. Greene, 13 F.3d at 583 ("Under the end result test, the step transaction doctrine will be
invoked if it appears that a series of separate transactions were prearranged parts of what was a
single transaction, cast from the outset to achieve the ultimate result"). See Kornfeld, 137 F.3d at
1235 ("The 'end result' test amalgamates into a single transaction separate events which appear to
be component parts of something undertaken to reach a particular result") (citing Associated
Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1991)).
133. Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613-614 (1938).
134. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983). See also
Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1429 (1987) ("At the other extreme [of the binding commitment
test], the most far-reaching alternative is the 'end result' test").
135. See Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *102-03 (2002) (quoting in
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True v. U.S. emphasized the application of the end result test."'
This case involved two transactions: 1
37
Ranchland Transactions: During the 1980s, the True family
purchased five ranch properties; 138 each purchase took place through the
same series of steps. 139 First, the taxpayers arranged for Smokey Oil
Company to purchase the properties, "while True Ranches acquired the
operating assets of each ranch."'140  Smokey Oil Company then
transferred the ranchlands to True Oil Company in a like-kind exchange
(under I.R.C. § 1031)141 for productive oil and gas leases. 142 "True Oil
Company immediately distributed the newly acquired ranchlands to the [
] family-member partners of True Oil Company as tenants in
common."'143 The partners then contributed their interests in the lands to
True Ranches by a general warranty deed.
144
This transaction resulted in the following tax consequences: I.R.C.
§ 1031(d) provides that the "basis of property received in a tax-free
exchange is the same as the basis of the property transferred." 145 Thus,
"Smokey Oil Company received depletable oil and gas leases with the
same cost basis it had in the non-depreciable ranchland it transferred."'
146
"This allowed Smokey Oil Company to claim cost depletion deductions
for the leases on its tax returns for 1989 and 1990 under section 612,
resulting in substantial tax savings for the True family."'
147
"True Oil Company, on the other hand, received the non-
depreciable ranchland with a zero basis because the oil and gas leases it
exchanged pursuant to section 1031 were fully cost depleted."'
' 48
Through the subsequent transfers, True Ranches acquired the ranchland
with the same zero basis as True Oil Company's oil and gas leases.' 49
part King Enters. Inc., 418 F.2d at 518).
136. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999).




141. I.R.C. § 1031 (2007).
142. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999).
143. Id. at 1168-69.
144. Id. at 1169. "Internal Revenue Code Sections 721 and 731 allowed the Trues to treat





149. Id. As the court summarized:
Ultimately, the Trues reaped the tax benefits of turning non-depreciable assets
(ranchlands) into cost-depletable assets (oil and gas leases) in the hands of Smokey Oil
2007]
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Oil and Gas Lease Transactions: Similarly, the Trues utilized Bear
Lodge Mountain Corporation and True Land and Royalty Company to
acquire and then assign oil and gas leases. 150  Bear Lodge Mountain
Corporation and True Land and Royalty Company acquired the oil and
gas leases, and shortly thereafter, assigned a 100 percent interest in the
leases to either True Oil Company or Smokey Oil Company. 151 "In
exchange, Bear Lodge Mountain Corporation or True Land and Royalty
Company retained an overriding royalty of five percent, against which
True Oil Company and Smokey Oil Company made annual advance
royalty payments.., over the life of the lease."'
152
"As a result of these transactions, True Oil Company and Smokey
Oil Company deducted the guaranteed minimum overriding royalties
paid to Bear Lodge Mountain Corporation and True Land and Royalty
Company on their tax returns for 1989 and 1990 under Treas. Reg.
1.612-3(b)(3)."' 5 3  This allowed True Oil Company and Smokey Oil
Company to immediately expense the royalty payments instead of
capitalizing the purchase of the leases as required for direct purchases of
those assets. 54  On the other side of the transaction, Bear Lodge
Mountain Corporation and True Land and Royalty Company reported
the royalty payments as income but claimed an offsetting cost depletion
deduction under Treas. Reg. 1.612-3(b)(1). 151
The Tenth Circuit applied only the end result and independence
test.156 In discussing the end result test, the court elaborated that "[t]he
intent we focus on under the end result test is not whether the taxpayer
intended to avoid taxes .... Instead, the end result test focuses on
whether the taxpayer intended to reach a particular result by structuring
a series of transactions in a certain way."
57
Company, with the residual effect of ridding True Oil Company of fully cost-depleted









156. Id. at 1175, n.8. According to the Court:
As a general rule, 'the binding-commitment test is only applicable where a substantial
period of time has passed between the steps that are subject to scrutiny.' Because the
transactions in the present case do not span a long period of time or involve a binding
commitment to pursue successive steps, we do not analyze them under this test.
Id. (quoting JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 43:256 (1997)).
157. Id. at 1175.
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The Tenth Circuit elaborated that:
[w]e emphasize that under the end result test, our focus is not on the
legitimacy of the intended result, but instead on whether the taxpayer
undertook multiple steps to achieve a particular result. Thus, if a
taxpayer engages in a series of steps that achieve a particular result, he
cannot request independent tax recognition of the individual steps
unless he shows that at the time he engaged in the individual step, its
result was the intended end result in and of itself. If this is not what
the taxpayer intended, then we collapse the series of steps and only
give tax consideration to the intended end result.158
Thus, the parties' intent for each event is examined separately, and
if the intent of the parties pertaining to a particular event is that such an
event will merely serve as another step in achieving an end result, the
court will disregard the event.
159
Similar to the binding commitment test, "a prerequisite to
application of the end result test is proof of an agreement or
understanding between the transacting parties to bring about the ultimate
result., 160 As the Tax Court indicated in Packard v. Comm 'r., "[w]here
an interrelated series of steps are taken pursuant to a plan to achieve an
intended result, the tax consequences are to be determined not by
viewing each step in isolation, but by considering all of them as an
integrated whole."
'161
The difference between the two tests, however, is that while the
binding commitment test is an objective test, the end result test is a
subjective test because it focuses on the parties' actual intent at the time
the transaction was entered into. 162  Nevertheless, as opposed to the
158. Id. at 1175, n.9.
159. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 191 (D. Conn. 2004)
("Relevant to this inquiry is the taxpayer's subjective intent to reach a particular result by directing
a series of transactions to an intended purpose or structuring them in a certain way") (citing True,
190 F.3d at 1175).
160. Id. (citing Blake v. Comm'r, 697 F.2d 473, 478-79 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Greene v.
United States, 13 F.3d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1994) ("For the government's characterization of the
transaction to be accurate, the record facts would have to demonstrate that a prearranged plan for
disposition of the futures contracts existed").
161. Packard v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 397, 420 (1985) (emphasis added).
162. True, 190 F.3d at 1175 ("The taxpayer's subjective intent is especially relevant under this
test because it allows us to determine whether the taxpayer directed a series of transactions to an
intended purpose."); Brown v. United States, 782 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting the "end
result test" for determining when to apply "step transaction doctrine" makes intent a necessary
element for application of doctrine); Weikel v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 432, *25 (1986) ("The
[end result] test involves an examination of the intention of the parties to determine what result the
parties were seeking when the transaction was undertaken") (citing Seymour S. Mintz & William T.
Plumb, Jr., Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 247,
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subjective business purpose test (which is a subjective analysis of the
taxpayer's intent under the economic substance's two prong test), where
the court focuses on the taxpayer's intent to avoid taxes, a court applying
the end result focuses on a different intension, namely the intent to reach
the end result.
In my view and as suggested in greater detail below, the end result
test should become the subjective prong of the step transaction doctrine.
In general, I think that the end result and business purpose tests share the
same fundamental principle - examining the taxpayer's subjective
motivation in connection with the transaction. Thus, similar to the
business purpose test that has become the subjective prong of the
economic substance test, the end result test would become the subjective
prong of the step transaction principle.
C. The Mutual-Interdependence Test
Pursuant to the third alternative test, separate steps will be
collapsed if, under a reasonable interpretation of the objectively stated
facts, the steps are interdependent on one another.' 63 Stated differently,
under the mutual interdependence test, the step transaction doctrine
applies if "the steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created




163. Kass v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 218, 226 (1973). See also Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169,
1177 (7th Cir. 1980), where the Court characterized the interdependence test as requiring "an
evaluation whether on a reasonable interpretation of objective facts the steps are so interdependent
that the legal relations created by one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of
the series.") (quoting Randolph E. Paul & Phillip Zimet, Step Transaction, in SELECTED STUDIES IN
FEDERAL TAXATION 200 & 204 (2d. Series 1938)); Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d
1234, 1244 (5th Cir. 1983). (same); McDonald's Rests. ofIll. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th
Cir. 1982); Kornfeld v. Comm'r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The 'interdependence
test' focuses on the relationship between the steps, whether under a reasonably objective view the
steps were so interdependent that the legal relations created by one of the transactions seem fruitless
without completion of the series") (citing Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States., 927
F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1991); King Enters. Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl.
1969) ("The 'interdependence test' requires an inquiry as to "whether on a reasonable interpretation
of objective facts the steps were so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction
would have been fruitless without a completion of the series") (quoting Randolph E. Paul & Phillip
Zimet, Step Transaction, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 & 204 (2d. Series
1938)).
164. Redding v. Comm'r, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoting Randolph E. Paul &
Phillip Zimet, Step Transaction, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200 & 204 (2d.
Series 1938)); True, 190 F.3d at 1175 ("The interdependence test takes a slightly different approach.
Under this test, we disregard the tax effects of individual transactional steps if 'it is unlikely that any
one step would have been undertaken except in contemplation of the other integrating acts')
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Thus, as opposed to the end result test, the mutual interdependence
test concentrates on the relationship between the steps, rather than on
their "end result.' 65  The court must, therefore, examine whether the
individual steps or events have independent significance or merely have
meaning as part of the larger transaction. 66 Accordingly, if the steps
have "reasoned economic justification standing alone," then applying the
mutual interdependence test is inappropriate.1 67 By contrast, when "it is
unlikely that any one step would have been undertaken except in
contemplation of the other integrating acts ... step transaction treatment
may be deemed appropriate."'' 68  In order to apply the mutual
interdependence test objectively, courts may compare the disputed
transaction with those usually expected to occur in otherwise bona fide
business settings.
169
The interdependence test has been applied frequently in cases
involving corporate transactions. 170 For example, in Kuper v. Comm 'r.,
shareholders of a realty-owning corporation contributed all of their
shares to an automobile dealership corporation owned by the same
shareholders, which, in turn, made a cash capital contribution on the
same day to the realty corporation, and on the following day the
automobile corporation exchanged the realty corporation's shares for
one stockholder's one-third ownership of the automobile corporation. 171
(quoting Kuper v. Comm'r, 533 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1976)).
165. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1245.
166. Id. See Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1430 (1987)
167. True, 190 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1247). See Andantech
L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *106 (2002).
168. Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1245 (quoting Kuper, 533 F.2d at 156) ("[the step
transaction] approach is especially proper where, as here, it is unlikely that any one step would have
been undertaken except in contemplation of the other integrating acts, all of which when seen
together substantively form a taxpayer level stock swap.").
169. Andantech L.L.C., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *106-07 ("In order to maintain this objectivity and
ensure the steps have independent significance, it is useful to compare the transactions in question
with those usually expected to occur in otherwise bona fide business settings.") (citing Merryman v.
Comm'r, 873 F.2d 879, 881 (5th Cir. 1989) affg 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (1988).
170. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d 1517, 1529 (10th Cir. 1991) (merger and
reorganization followed by transfer of subsidiary treated as complete liquidation). See also Sec.
Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d 1234 (acquisitions and reorganizations followed by transfer treated as
complete liquidations); McDonald's Rests. ofIll., 688 F.2d 520 (merger and stock transfer followed
by sale of stock treated as liquidation); South Bay Corp. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965)
(purchase of controlling interest in corporations followed by merger into principal corporation
treated as purchase by principal corporation of controlling interests); King Enters., 418 F.2d at 5 14-
19 (stock acquisition followed by merger treated as reorganization). See generally Seymour S.
Mintz & William T. Plumb, Jr., Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX'N 247 (1954).
171. Kuper v. Comm'r, 533 F.2d 152, 153-55 (5th Cir. 1976).
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's finding that these steps were
mere steps to disguise a stock-for-stock transaction at the shareholder
level, and therefore it treated the steps as a taxable exchange of stock.
172
In my view, the interdependence and end result tests differ in one
important aspect - while the former test focuses on the question whether,
objectively, each step is meaningless without the others, the latter test
focuses on the parties' subjective intent in connection with the
transaction. Thus, these two tests supplement each other in many
aspects.
D. Summary
In my view, while most courts in cases involving the step
transaction principle state that there are three alterative tests, as a
practical matter, there is only one two-prong test. 173 As set forth above,
the binding commitment test is rarely used and the IRS clearly avoids
using it in its argument because it is the hardest to prove. In my view,
this test should not be enumerated as one of three tests and could simply
become a strong indicator that the step transaction ought to apply. As to
the other two tests, in my view, they should become a two-prong test
pursuant to which the step transaction doctrine would apply to collapse
certain steps if both tests are met.
IV. THE TIMING DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EACH STEP
The essence of the step transaction doctrine involves evaluating
whether several steps, typically made within a short period, ought to be
collapsed into a single transaction.17 4  Thus, "Courts will often, in
addition to the tests noted above, examine the timing of the transaction
at issue. ''175 The Tax Court held that lapse of time between each step
172. Id. at 160-163.
173. See, e.g., Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm'r 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1183, *12 (1999).
Regardless of which theory is used under the step- transaction doctrine, the facts in this
case result in the same conclusion. The facts reflect a step transaction created simply to
bypass U.S. withholding tax. Del Netherlands had minimal assets, and Del Netherlands
had only transitory possession of and no control over the $14 million loan proceeds as
the proceeds were passed from Delcom Financial to Del Commercial. Apart from the
purported $14 million loan to Del Commercial, Del Netherlands engaged in minimal
business activity, and the Barbados branch of Del Netherlands had no officer with any
substantive duties or responsibilities.
Id.
174. See generally Andantech L.L.C., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) at *99-114.
175. Weikel v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 432 (1986). As the court illustrated in footnote 19:
... if two transactions occur within an hour of each other it would be reasonable to assume that the
[22:45
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may indicate whether such steps ought to be collapsed under the step
transaction doctrine. 
176
In Litton Industries v. Comm'r.,177 a subsidiary declared a $30
million dividend, which it paid to the corporation in the form of a
promissory note. 178  Two weeks later, the corporation publicly
announced its interest in disposing of the subsidiary. 179 At the first step,
the corporation prepared a partial public offering of the subsidiary's
stock.1 80  Then, it decided to make a complete public offering. 181 Prior
to this public offering, another company bought all of the subsidiary's
stock for cash and paid the corporation $30 million for the promissory
note. 182 The Tax Court held that the dividend and acquisition constituted
two separate transactions rather than a single transaction, partially on the
grounds that a period of six months had elapsed between the dividend
and the subsidiary's purchase.1 83 The Tax Court distinguished this case
from Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Comm'r.,184 where all of the steps
took place within one hour and a half and as a result, the court collapsed
the steps, applying the step transaction doctrine.
185
In Waterman Steamship, the corporation received an offer to
purchase the stock of two of its wholly owned subsidiary corporations,
second transaction was prearranged given the fact that it would be difficult to conceive and execute
the second transaction in the interval of time available." Id. at n. 19, citing Mintz and Plumb, Step
Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 247 (1954).
176. D'Angelo Assoc., Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 121, 129 (1978). See also Treas. Reg. §1.368-
2(c) (as amended in 2006) pursuant to which the step transaction doctrine may apply if the relevant
steps take place "over a relatively short period of time such as 12 months." See also Kimberly S.
Blanchard, NYSBA Comments on Temporary Regs on Affiliate-Owned Stock Rule, Tax Notes Today,
March 23, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 56-32, at n.45 ("Absent a binding commitment at the time of
the first transaction to effect the second transaction, the shorter the period between the two the
likelier that step-transaction doctrine will be applied. See, e.g., P.L.R. 8742033 (July 20, 1987) (two
transactions separated by 4 months were not independent)); Rev. Rul. 66-23, 1966-1 C.B. 67,
declared obsolete on other grounds by T.D. 8760 (Jan. 28, 1998); Rev. Rul. 2003-99, 2003-2 C.B.
388 (discussing notwithstanding requirement, at time of acquisition, to dispose of target within 7
years, acquisition and subsequent disposition not stepped together); Rev. Rul. 69-48, 1969-1 C.B.
106 (discussing two transactions separated by 22.5 months stepped together").
177. 89 T.C. 1086 (1987).
178. Id. at 1088.
179. Id.
180. Idat 1088-89.
181. Id. at 1089.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1100. The Tax Court also indicated, however, that that at the time of dividend, the
sale was not prearranged. Id.
184. 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970).
185. Litton Industries, 89 T.C. at 1096-97. But see Uniroyal v. Comm'r 65 T.C.M. (CCH)
2690 (1993) (noting that the steps took place closely in time, but the court did not collapse them).
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Pan-Atlantic and Gulf Florida, for $3,500,000 in cash. 186 The board of
directors countered with an offer to sell the two subsidiaries for
$700,000 after the subsidiaries declared and arranged for payments of
dividends to Waterman Steamship amounting in the aggregate to
$2,800,000.187 The agreements included provisions for the declaration
of a dividend by Pan-Atlantic to Waterman Steamship prior to the
signing of the sales agreement and the closing of that transaction.
188
Furthermore, the agreements called for the purchaser to loan or
otherwise advance funds to Pan-Atlantic promptly in order to pay off the
promissory note by which the dividend had been paid.
18 9
Once the agreement was reached, the entire transaction was carried
out by a series of meetings commencing at 12 noon on January 21, 1955,
and ending at 1:30 p.m. the same day. 190 As the Fifth Circuit observed:
"By the end of the day and within a ninety minute period, the financial
cycle had been completed. Waterman had $3,500,000, hopefully tax-
free, all of which came from Securities and McLean, the buyers of the
stock."'19
In Coltec Indus. Inc. v. U.S.192 although the step transaction was not
explicitly discussed, the court held that the "longer the life span of the
corporate vehicle utilized and term of any promissory notes issued, the
more likely a court will find the transaction to have been undertaken for
a 'business purpose. 193
In D'Angelo Assoc., Inc. v. Comm'r., immediately upon its
incorporation in 1960, the taxpayer transferred its shares to a dentist and
his family at the dentist's direction.1 94 At the same time, the dentist
made a cash payment to the taxpayer, which assumed a mortgage
liability on the dentist's office building and issued a note to the
dentist. 195  On its 1970 income tax return, the taxpayer claimed
depreciation on the office building and deductions for life insurance
premiums and vehicle expenses. 196 The Tax Court held that:
186. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 650, 653 (1968).
187. Id. at 653-54.
188. Id. at 660.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 656-57.
191. Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Comm'r, 430 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1970).
192. 62 Fed. C1. 716 (2004).
193. Id. at 743 (citing Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935)). See also Estate of
Kanter v. Comm'r, 337 F.3d 833, 865-66 (7th Cir. 2003).
194. D'Angelo Assoc., Inc. v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 121, 123 (1978).
195. Id. at 123-126
196. Id. at 127.
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Petitioner has failed to convince us that a sale took place. The events
significant to the creation of petitioner occurred almost simultaneously.
The formation of petitioner, the transfer of $15,000 cash to petitioner
for the issuance of 60 shares of stock, and the transfer of the rental
property to petitioner for the return of the $15,000 in cash and the
notes all occurred within an interval of less than 10 days. See sec.
1.351-1(a)(1), Income Tax Regs. The evidence demonstrates that
these steps were integral parts of a plan designed by [the taxpayer] to
transfer the assets used primarily in his dental practice from individual
to corporate ownership.
Recently, in InterTAN v. Comm 'r,198 the Tax Court disregarded the
issuance and redemption of preferred stock of a Canadian subsidiary that
took place on the same day.199 The court found that "[t]he disputed
transaction resulted in no change or the economic position of either
petitioner or [its subsidiary], 2 °0 and that
[t]he purported issuance to petitioner of [the subsidiary]'s preferred
stock was but one fleeting, transitory step in the disputed transaction
that was undertaken so that [the subsidiary] could immediately redeem
that stock, thereby enabling petitioner to claim that such redemption
resulted in a dividend to it under sections 302 and 301.2°1
In conclusion, the lapse of time between the steps is also relevant
for determining which alternative test is to be applied. In a case in which
the steps take place within a relatively long period, the IRS may attempt
to apply the binding commitment test, pursuant to which steps might be
collapsed into a single transaction even if the time lapsed between each
step is long.20 2  Nevertheless, since the binding commitment test is
hardly used, the lapse of time between the each step would be a factor in
either the end result or the interdependence tests. In both tests, steps that
take place within a very short time could still be respected as separate,
but the taxpayer will have to work harder to prove that each step has its
own significance.
197. Id. at 129-30.
198. 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 767 (2004), aff'd, IntertTAN Inc. v. Comm'r 117 Fed. Appx. 348 (5th
Cir. 2004).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 40.
201. Id.
202. See Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *101-02 (2002) (citing
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States., 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 n.6 (10th Cir. 1991))
(rejecting use of the binding commitment test because the case did not involve a series of
transactions spanning several years).
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V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STEP TRANSACTION PRINCIPLE
AND THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE/BUSINESS PURPOSE TEST
The step transaction doctrine is strongly related to the substance-
over-form and economic substance/business purpose doctrines.2 °3 In
Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. U.S., the Tenth Circuit further
explained that:
The law is unclear as to the relationship between the step transaction
doctrine and the business purpose requirement. Our survey of the
relevant cases suggests that no firm line delineates the boundary
between the two. Most cases applying the step transaction doctrine, far
from identifying business purpose as an element whose absence is
prerequisite to that application, do not even include discussion of
business purpose as a related issue. In some cases, the existence of a
business purpose is considered one factor in determining whether form
and substance coincide. In others, the lack of business purpose is
accepted as reason to apply the step transaction doctrine. We have
found no case holding that the existence of a business purpose
precludes the application of the step transaction doctrine.
204
In some instances, taxpayers enter into a series of steps or
transactions, each of which might be valid under the economic substance
and/or business purpose tests. Many taxpayers have attempted to argue
(some successfully and some not) that in such cases, the step transaction
doctrine should not apply.
203. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REv.
365, 388 (1988).
Because the step transaction doctrine determines only what actions are to be looked at
together to determine the "substance" of the transaction, its application is necessarily
(but, again, not always explicitly) followed by application of the substance versus form
doctrine, in that courts must determine the appropriate tax characterization of the
redefined exchanges.
Id.
204. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1526-27. The Court in True v. U.S.
stated:
The Trues' evidence and arguments regarding business purpose and economic effects
raise issues more relevant to a sham transaction doctrine analysis than a step transaction
doctrine analysis. Although both the step transaction and sham transaction doctrines are
corollaries of the basic substance over form principle.., the sham transaction doctrine
focuses on whether a questionable transaction has a business purpose and economic
effects other than the creation of tax benefits,.... As described above, the step
transaction doctrine is particularly tailored to the examination of transactions involving a
series of potentially interrelated steps for which the taxpayer seeks independent tax
treatment. Consequently, the step transaction doctrine provides the pertinent analytical
framework in this case.
True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1177 n.l 1 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
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Many courts have refused to collapse a series of steps or
transactions if all of them had legitimate tax consequences. 205 As the
Tax Court elaborated:
Just as the step transaction doctrine is inappropriate to generate events,
neither may it rearrange events so as to cause a significant step in a
transaction which actually takes place in one year to be treated for tax
purposes as having taken place in a different year. Where a particular
step has an independent tax consequence, as is the case here, that step
is given its tax consequence in the particular year in which it takes
place. The transfer of assets and distribution of stock each had
independent substance.... We hold that when a taxpayer adheres
strictly to the requirements of a statute intended to confer tax benefits,
whether or not steps in an integrated transaction, when the result of the
steps is what is intended by the parties and fits within the particular
statute, and when each of the several steps and the timing thereof has
economic substance and is motivated by valid business purposes, the
steps shall be given effect according to their respective terms.
In Vest v. Comm 'r,2°7 the taxpayers organized a corporation for the
purpose of correcting certain title problems in some land interests and to
develop the mineral interests in the land.20 8 At the time of incorporation,
the taxpayers were unaware that an exchange of stock was being
contemplated between the formed corporation and an unrelated
corporation that was interested in a lease of the oil and gas rights on
taxpayers' land.20 9  The corporation was incorporated on July 21,
1965,210 and on August 25, 1965 it signed a plan of reorganization with
the unrelated party that provided for an exchange of stock.21' The
corporation did not engage in any business operations and was dissolved
shortly after the reorganization occurred.212 Despite the close proximity
205. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 541, 583 (1993) ("[T]he step-
transaction doctrine is inapplicable since the steps comprising each yen borrowing in its entirety
were not meaningless-they were genuine and had economic substance"); Esmark, Inc. v. Comm'r,
90 T.C. 171, 195 (1988) ("Whether invoked as a result of the 'binding commitment',
'interdependence' or 'end result' tests, the doctrine combines a series of individually meaningless
steps into a single transaction"); MAS One L.P. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (S.D. Ohio
2003), aff'd, 390 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2004).
206. See Tandy Corp. v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1165, 1172-73 (1989).
207. 57 T.C. 128 (1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 238 (5th
Cir. 1973).
208. Id. at 128-35.
209. Id. at 144-146.
210. Id. at 135.
211. Id. at 136.
212. Id. at 136.
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of the incorporation to the exchange of stock, the Tax Court held that the
step transaction doctrine was inapplicable because there was a business
purpose for the formation of the corporation, (i.e., to develop the mineral
rights of the taxpayers' properties and to resolve the title problems
inherent in those properties).213
In Falconwood Corp. v. United States,21 4 a parent corporation
(TMCH) owned the stock of three companies, Mocatta, RC, and FSC.2 15
Mocatta owned 100 percent of the stock of MFC, which owned 100
percent of the stock of WCI. 216 On December 23, 1986, TMCH and RC
merged into Mocatta, 1 and WCI merged into MFC.21 s As a result,
Mocatta owned all of the stock of MFC and FSC. 219 Several hours later
Mocatta sold the stock of MFC and FSC to its shareholders. 220 Mocatta
filed a consolidated return for 1987 and claimed a $10.3 million loss
incurred after December 23, 1986, against the group's income for the
1984, 1986, and 1987 tax years. 2
Applying the step transaction principle, the IRS determined that the
group terminated on December 23, 1986, that it must file a final
consolidated return for the short tax year from April 1, 1986, to
December 23, 1986, and that Mocatta, MFC, and FSC, would need to
file individual returns for the period from December 24, 1986, to March
31, 1987. 222
The Court of Federal Claims223 agreed with the IRS and determined
that the group did not survive the merger because retaining the
subsidiaries for only three hours following the merger did not satisfy the
requirement under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(d)(2)(ii) 224 that there
213. Id. at 143-146. See also Weikel v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 432, *37-38 (1986) (citing
Vest v. Comn'r, 57 T.C. 128, 143-146 (1971), affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 481
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1973)); Yamamoto v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 946, 955 (1980) ("The mere fact that
steps occur close in time does not mean they are interrelated").
214. 422 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
215. Id. at 1341.
216. Id.




221. Id. at 1343.
222. Id.
223. Falconwood Corp. v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 485 (2004).
224. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(d)(2)(ii) provides:
The group shall be considered as remaining in existence notwithstanding that the
common parent is no longer in existence if the members of the affiliated group succeed
to and become the owners of substantially all of the assets of such former parent and
there remains one or more chains of includible corporations connected through stock
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"remains" a chain of subsidiaries. 225  The court also applied the end
result test of the step transaction doctrine (see below) and concluded that
because the parties never intended to leave in place "a chain of
corporations connected through stock ownership with a common
parent"226 the group terminated on December 23, 1986.227
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed and remanded on two
grounds.228 First, the Federal Circuit observed that pursuant to Treas.
Reg. § 1.1502-75(d)(2)(ii), for a consolidated group to survive the
merger of its common parent, the regulations should be read literally
rather than substantively. 229 Second, the Federal Circuit held that the
step transaction principles have no role in the analysis because the
transaction was supported by independent business purpose.230  The
court observed that the step transaction doctrine "cannot override the
statutory and regulatory context governing consolidated tax returns from
which this case arises.' 23 1 The court concluded that "the regulations at
issue leave no room for an application of the step transaction doctrine,
where the [TMCH group] proceeded [with the initial mergers] for an
independent business purpose and was thereafter bound to follow the
consolidated return regulations at issue.
232
In MAS One L.P. v. United States,233 MAS One Limited Partnership
was formed for the purpose of owning and operating an office building
and had one general partner ("Generals") and one limited partner
("Midland"). 234 In 1989, MAS One amended its partnership agreement
to expand its purpose to constructing and operating a second office
building.235 To fund the expansion, MAS One borrowed $14.5 million
from The Huntington National Bank.236  Generals' liability
notwithstanding, Huntington required Midland to execute two guarantee
ownership with a common parent corporation which is an includible corporation and
which was a member of the group prior to the date such former parent ceases to exist.
Id. (as amended in 2006).
225. Falconwood Corp., 60 Fed. Cl. at 490-91.
226. Id. at491
227. Id.
228. Falconwood Corp. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
229. Id. at 1348-49.
230. Id. at 1349-51.
231. Id. at 1353.
232. Id. at 1351.
233. MAS One L.P. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
234. Id. at 1062.
235. Id.
236. Id. This loan was on a recourse basis, and under the loan's terms, Generals, as the general
partner, would be liable for its repayment. Id.
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agreements.237 The first required Midland to pay $2.5 million of the
principal of the tower loan upon substantial completion of the office
building.238 The second agreement required Midland to guarantee all
interest payments for the life of the tower loan.239
In 1994, for other business reasons, Midland sought to divest itself
of its MAS One investment.240  Therefore, on December 28, 1994,
Midland abandoned its interest in MAS One immediately after a new,
nominal partner was admitted to the partnership as a limited partner (for
a contribution of only $10).241 On December 29, 1994, MAS One sold
the property for $4.1 million (paid to Huntington).242 Midland then paid
Huntington approximately $8.3 million, the remaining balance of the
tower loan, even though it was not liable to repay the loan principal
under its guarantees.243
On its 1994 return, MAS One treated Midland's $8.3 million
payment to Huntington as a capital contribution. 244  MAS One also
claimed a $7.3 million loss on the sale of the office building (allocating
98% to Generals and 2% to the new partner).245 The IRS, however,
disagreed and treated Midland's $8.3 million payment as partnership
income under I.R.C. § 61.246
The IRS asked the District Court to apply the step transaction
doctrine because "the individual steps involved with Midland's
divestment of its Partnership interest should be as a single transaction,
not a series of independent transactions. 247 The taxpayer responded by
stating that each independent transaction had business purpose and
therefore, the step transaction doctrine was thus inapplicable.248
The court agreed with the IRS that Midland's $8.3 million payment
constituted income to the partnership, but still had to consider whether
the step transaction applied.249  The court first noted that "the step










246. Id. at 1064.
247. Id.
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but can also be used for a taxpayer's benefit. ,250 As to the present case,
the District Court held that "The step transaction doctrine is inapplicable
in this case because the substance and the form of the transaction in
question do not differ in any meaningful way. '251 Furthermore, the court
elaborated that "each of the 'steps' of Midland's divestment of its
interest in the Partnership had its own legitimate tax consequences. In
fact, the tax consequences of each step of the transaction would be the
same regardless of whether the Court views the transaction as a whole or
as a series of isolated steps. 252 The District Court concluded that:
MAS One makes no attempt to avoid taxation in this case by focusing
on isolated steps of a transaction rather than a whole transaction.
Instead, each of the "steps" of Midland's divestment of its interest in
the Partnership had its own legitimate tax consequences. In fact, the
tax consequences of each step of the transaction would be the same
regardless of whether the Court views the transaction as a whole or as
a series of isolated steps.
2 53
It appears that the meaning of the phrase "legitimate tax
consequences" for this purpose is that each "step," standing alone, had
economic substance and business purpose.254 The court, therefore,
refused to apply the step transaction and disregard the separate steps. 5
Under this approach, the step transaction doctrine is inapplicable
whenever the taxpayer can show that each step could sustain the
economic substance examination.256
Nevertheless, several courts have held that the existence of business
purposes and economic substance for each individual step in a series of
steps or transactions does not preclude the application of the step
transaction doctrine.257 As the Tenth Circuit explained in True v. U.S.:
250. Id. (citing Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989) (applying the step transaction







257. Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *97-98 (2002) ("The existence of
business purposes and economic effects relating to the individual steps in a complex series of
transactions does not preclude application of the step transaction doctrine") (citing True v. United
States, 190 F. 3d. 1165, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 1999)); Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d
173, 183 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Here, although the individual steps of the transaction had a legitimate
business reason, the transaction must be treated as a single unit and judged by its end result"); True,
190 F.3d at 1177 (stating that a non-tax "business purpose by itself does not preclude application of
the step transaction doctrine"); Kuper v. Comm'r, 533 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1976) ("A legitimate
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To ratify a step transaction that exalts form over substance merely
because the taxpayer can either (1) articulate some business purpose
allegedly motivating the indirect nature of the transaction or (2) point
to an economic effect resulting from the series of steps, would
frequently defeat the purpose of the substance over form principle.
Events such as the actual payment of money, legal transfer of property,
adjustment of company books, and execution of a contract all produce
economic effects and accompany almost any business dealing. Thus,
we do not rely on the occurrence of these events alone to determine
whether the step transaction doctrine applies. Likewise, a taxpayer
may proffer some non-tax business purpose for engaging in a series of
transactional steps to accomplish a result he could have achieved by
more direct means, but that business purpose by itself does not
preclude application of the step transaction doctrine.
Similarly, in Long Term Capital Holding (discussed below) the
court rejected a similar argument made by the taxpayer and held that
"[the] application of the step transaction doctrine by its nature may
business goal does not grant taxpayer carte blanche to subvert Congressionally mandated tax
patterns."); South Bay Corp. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[I]t must be doubted
that the degree of integration requisite ... can, or ought to, go to the extreme of requiring that each
step be devoid of business significance unless united with one or more of the other steps"). But cf
Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 251 F.3d 210, 213 (D.C. Cir. 2001). ("Under the step-
transaction doctrine, a particular step in a transaction is disregarded for tax purposes if the taxpayer
could have achieved its objective more directly, but instead included the step for no other purpose
than to avoid U.S. taxes").
258. True, 190 F.3d at 1177. See also Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States,
927 F.2d 1517, 1527 (10th Cir. 1991). The Associated Wholesale Grocers Court distinguished Vest
and Weikel, stating:
Vest. .. considers business purpose as one factor among many in declining to apply the
step transaction doctrine. After identifying a business purpose, the court undertakes a
thorough discussion of whether to treat a stock exchange as a step transaction. 57 T.C. at
145. The court remarked "[tihe fact that there were business purposes for the
incorporation of V Bar is an indication that its formation was not a step mutually
interdependent with the subsequent stock exchange" and continued to consider other
factors, including the existence of a binding commitment, the timing of the steps, and the
actual intent of the parties. Id. at 145-46 (emphasis added). Far from precluding step
transaction analysis, the business purpose was not even considered the most significant
factor in Vest.
Weikel.. . appears to support the proposition [that the existence of a business purpose
precludes the application of the step transaction doctrine]. Weikel, however, erroneously
states that Vest declined to apply step transaction analysis because a business purpose
was found. Id. at 440. Because Vest said no such thing, Weikel must be discounted.
Id. at n.15. See Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp 2d 122, 193 (D.C.Conn.
2004) (citing Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1527). See also Long-Term Capital
Holdings, LP v. United States, 150 Fed. Appx. 40, 43 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[A]ny economic effects that
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ignore economic relations created by the parties, notwithstanding impact
on bona fide economic effects., 259 Nevertheless, because the court first
discussed the economic substance and business purpose aspects of the
transaction and concluded that the transaction had neither of these, it
would follow that the step transaction analysis ought to result in favor of
the government. In other words, as I conclude below, when a
transaction has no economic substance, it is hard to imagine that a court
will allow tax benefits under the step transaction principle.
In Del Commercial Props., Inc. v. Comm 'r, the facts were as
follows. Del Commercial Properties, Inc. is a fourth-tier subsidiary of
an affiliated group whose parent is DL Shekels Holdings Ltd.260 Delcom
Financial Ltd. is a second-tier subsidiary in the group.26' Delcom
Financial is a Canadian corporation that owns 100% of the stock of
Delcom Holdings, Ltd., another Canadian corporation.262 Delcom
Holdings owns 100% of Delcom Cayman, Ltd. (Cayman Islands), which
owns 100% of the outstanding stock of Delcom Antilles, N.V.
(Netherlands Antilles). 263 "Delcom Antilles owns 100% of the
outstanding stock of Del Investments Netherlands B.V., a corporation
organized in the Netherlands.,
264
On July 18, 1990, the Royal Bank of Canada loaned $18 million to
Delcom Financial.265 That same day, Delcom Financial made two
unsecured interest-bearing loans to Delcom Holdings, one of which (the
one relevant to this case) was for $14 million.266 Delcom Holdings then
contributed about $14 million to Delcom Cayman for common stock.26 7
On the same day, Delcom Cayman contributed about $14 million to
Delcom Antilles and received common stock in that entity.268 Later that
date, Delcom Antilles contributed about $14 million to Del BV and
received common stock in that entity.269 The following day, Del
Commercial borrowed $14 million from Del BV.270 That same day, it
259. Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp 2d at 193.
260. Del Commercial Props., Inc., 251 F.3d at 211. From 1990 through 1993, Del Commercial
Properties, Inc.'s principal business was leasing industrial real estate it owned in the United States.
Id. at 212.
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guaranteed repayment of a portion of amounts owed by Delcom
Financial to Royal Bank and authorized Royal Bank to place a mortgage
on its real property in the U.S. 271 On January 1, 1991, Del Commercial
began repaying Del BV.272  Beginning in July 1992, Del Commercial
began making its loan payments directly to Delcom Financial, and
Delcom Financial then forwarded funds to Royal Bank in payment on
the Royal Bank loan.273
The Tax Court held that the series of loans and stock contributions
that began with Delcom Financial and ended with Del Commercial
"reflect a step transaction created simply to bypass U.S. withholding
tax. 274
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the Tax court's decision and observed
that "[i]n step-transaction cases, 'the existence of formal business
activity is a given but the inquiry turns on the existence of a nontax
business motive. ,,275 Accordingly, the court further explained that
"[t]he Internal Revenue Service-and the courts-will ignore a step in a
series of transactions if that step does 'not appreciably affect [the
taxpayer's] beneficial interest except to reduce his tax.' 2 76
In Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. U.S., the taxpayer relied
on Rev. Rul. 79-250,277 pursuant to which:
The Internal Revenue Service has indicated on several occasions that
threshold steps will not be disregarded under a step transaction
271. Id. Del Commercial "also agreed to provide Royal Bank with 'annual
financial statements, to insure its real property, to assign the insurance policies to Royal Bank, to
defer paying dividends to shareholders, and to use the proceeds from any sales of real property to
make payments on the $14 million Royal Bank loan."' Id. (quoting Brief for Appellee, Id. (No 01-
681) at 3).
272. Id. Del BV transferred these payments either to Delcom Holdings or Delcom Financial.
Id.
273. Id. "Throughout this time, Del BV reported the interest paid by appellant as income on its
Netherlands tax returns. Meanwhile, Del Commercial did not file United States withholding tax
returns or deposit withholding taxes on any payments related to the loan." Id.
274. Del Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 1183, *11 (1999) ("We
have applied the step-transaction doctrine to disregard the use of intermediaries and conduits for
Federal tax purposes"). Because the taxpayer had not "presented any credible argument" that its
failure to file a tax return or deposit withholding taxes was "attributable to reasonable cause," the
Tax Court concluded that appellant owed penalties in addition to the withholding taxes. Id. at 14.
275. Del Commercial Props., Inc., 251 F.3d at 214 (quoting ASA Investerings Partnership v.
Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
276. Id. (quoting ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 514 (quoting Knetsch v. United States, 364
U.S. 361, 366 (1960))) (emphasis in original). The court elaborated that "if the sole purpose of a
transaction with a foreign corporation is to dodge U.S. taxes, the treaty cannot shield the taxpayer
from the fatality of the step-transaction doctrine." Id.
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analysis if such preliminary activity results in a permanent alteration of
a previous bona fide business relationship. Thus, the substance of each
of a series of steps will be recognized and the step transaction doctrine
will not apply, if each such step demonstrates independent economic
significance, is not subject to attack as a sham, and was undertaken for
valid business purposes and not mere avoidance of taxes.
278
The court, however, refused to rely on this ruling, and held that
"We therefore reject the contention that a valid business purpose bars
application of step transaction analysis in this context."
279
In conclusion, the court in The Falconwood Corp. v. United
States280 provided an excellent summary of the competing authorities on
that matter and concluded that
[b]ecause the regulations [broke] no discretion on the part of
Falconwood in filing a consolidated tax return once the Mocatta Group
proceeded to Configuration B, a move motivated by an independent
business purpose, we think it correct to require both parties, turning
square comers, to live with the end result of Falconwood's regulatory
compliance .... We thus determine that an independent business
purpose precludes application of the step transaction doctrine in the
context of the particular regulatory scheme at issue here... 281
On the other hand, as discussed above, other circuits such as the
Second Circuit in Long-Term Capital Holding have different view.
28 2
In my view, the existence of business purpose and economic
substance for each step could be a factor in not applying the step
transaction doctrine, but not the only one. Thus, a court should consider
all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the existence of such
business purpose in determining the application of the doctrine.
278. Id. at 1526 n.8 (quoting Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 C.B. 156).
279. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1527. See also Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v.
Cormn'r, 347 F.3d 173, 183 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, although the individual steps of the transaction had a legitimate business reason,
the transaction must be treated as a single unit and judged by its end result. "To ratify a
step transaction that exalts form over substance merely because the taxpayer can either
(1) articulate some business purpose allegedly motivating the indirect nature of the
transaction or (2) point to an economic effect resulting from the series of steps, would
frequently defeat the purpose of the substance over form principle."
Id. (quoting True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999)).
280. 422 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
281. Id. at 1352.
282. See Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, 150 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2005).
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VI. THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE AS A BACKSTOP
As discussed herein, in many cases involving a series of
transactions or steps, the IRS challenged the associated tax benefits with
the step transaction principle. In these cases, the doctrine was used by
the IRS as the primary weapon in its challenge, and the courts followed
with a decision based on the doctrine.283 Nevertheless, in several recent
high-profile tax shelter cases, the IRS has been raising the step
transaction argument as an alternative (rather than primary) argument to
disallow tax benefits. In particular, in Anadantech, L.L.C., Long Term
Capital Holding, and Santa Monica (discussed below) the IRS has
mainly relied on the economic substance/business purpose analysis, but
as an alternative, argued that the disputed transaction ought to be
reclassified under the step transaction principle, resulting in
disallowance of tax benefits. In these cases, as discussed below, the
courts agreed with the IRS, applied the doctrine, and reached the same
conclusion that was reached under the economic substance analysis.
A. Andantech, L.L.C. v. Comm 'r.
Andantech, L.L.C. was formed by two Belgian284 individuals with
$200,000 of equity ($196,000 by one partner and $4,000 by the other)285
and a $14.9 million loan from a Swiss Bank.286 Andantech purchased
computers from Comdisco for $14.9 million in cash and $107 million in
notes and leased them back to Comdisco for 36 months.287 Andantech
sold the rents due from Comdisco to a NationsBank for $87.8 million.288
This sale resulted in redemption of $87.8 million of the notes due from
Andantech to Comdisco, leaving approximately $19.5 million of the
notes outstanding.28 9
Shortly after, the Belgian members assigned their interests in
Andantech to U.S. entities. 290 In return for the assignment, the assigning
members holding 98% interest received preferred shares in RDL that
provided for a 6.878 dividend rate and a liquidation preference or
283. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1521-26; Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415,
1428 (1987).
284. Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1476, *11 (2002).
285. Id. at *49-50.
286. Id. at *52.
287. Id. The computers were leased to end-users. Id. at *51.
288. Id. at *62.
289. Id. at *20-41, charts 1-12.
290. Id. at *63. Two percent were sold to an entity ultimately owned by a charitable trust and
98% interest was sold to RDL Leasing, Inc. Id. at *64.
[22:45
44
Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 22 [2007], Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol22/iss1/2
RETHINKING ROLE OF JUDICIAL STEP TRANSACTION PRINCIPLE
$615,000.291 The members treated the assignments of interests as a
termination of a partnership; 292 therefore, the income from the sale of the
rent income would not be subject to U.S. tax.2 93 RDL viewed its basis in
Andantech the same as the transferor's basis under I.R.C. §362(a). 294
Andantech treated the assignment of interests as a deemed distribution
and re-contribution of partnership property to a new partnership under
Treas. Reg. §l.708-1(b)(1)(iv). 295  Accordingly, Andantech took the
view that it has a substituted basis in the computers equal to the
computers' adjusted basis in the hands of the contributing partners, and
that such computers are eligible for depreciation in the hands of the new
U.S. partners.296
The Tax Court disallowed the tax benefits under a number of
theories. First, the Tax Court observed that Andantech did not constitute
a valid partnership for federal income tax purposes because the partners
never intended to join together for the purpose of carrying on a business
and sharing in the profits and losses from an equipment leasing
activity.297 The Tax Court observed that for this purpose, "'[b]usiness
activity' excludes activity whose sole purpose is tax avoidance.,
298
Accordingly, the Tax Court held that "[t]he record reveals that
Andantech-Foreign was not created for the purpose of carrying on a
trade or business but rather to strip the income from the transaction and
avoid U.S. taxation. Consequently, we will not recognize Andantech-
Foreign as a partnership for Federal income tax purposes. 299
Second, the Tax Court applied the step transaction principle and
concluded that even if Andantech constituted a valid partnership for
federal income tax purposes, the period when Andantech was owned by
the Belgian members, through the sale of the rent income, should be
disregarded under the step-transaction doctrine because the involvement
of the Belgian members was merely to act as a shell or conduit to strip
the rental income from the overall transaction. 300  The Tax Court first
observed that "Under the step transaction doctrine, a series of formally
291. Id. The loan from the Swiss Bank was accelerated by virtue of the assignment; therefore,
the new domestic members contributed capital to repay the loan. Id. at *66.
292. Id. at *68.
293. Id. at *87.
294. Id. at *84.
295. Id. at *85.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *90.
298. Id. at *91 (citing ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505, 512 (D.C. Cir.
2000)).
299. Id. at *95 (citing ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 512).
300. Id. at *96.
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separate steps may be collapsed and treated as a single transaction if the





Under this standard, thus, the Tax Court held that the transaction
should be treated as directly between Comdisco and RDL (the majority
U.S. member who would enjoy the rental income as well as deductions
associated with the computers).30 2
The Tax Court discussed all three alternative tests under the step
transaction doctrine and observed that "[m]ore than one test might be
appropriate under any given set of circumstances; however, the
circumstances need satisfy only one of the tests in order for the step
transaction doctrine to operate. 30 3 The Tax Court first discussed the
binding commitment test and observed that
[b]ecause the transactions in the present case do not span a long period
of time or involve a binding commitment to pursue successive steps,
we do not analyze them under the binding commitment test. Thus, in
this case, only the end result and interdependence tests are relevant to
our step transaction analysis.
304
The Tax Court, therefore, continued and applied the end result test.
The Tax Court explained the application of the end result test:
The end result test combines into a single transaction separate events
that appear to be components of something undertaken to reach a
particular result. Under the end result test, if we find that a series of
closely related steps in a transaction is merely the means to reach a
particular end result, we will not separate the steps but instead will
treat them as a single transaction.
30 5
Applying this standard, the Tax Court observed that it must
examine "whether Comdisco and Norwest intended from the outset to
transfer the benefits and burdens of the sale-leaseback of the equipment
to RD Leasing.
30 6
Accordingly, the court continued "[i]f the intended end result was
for RD Leasing to have those benefits and burdens, then petitioners
cannot claim a right to favorable tax treatment for the various
301. Id. at*99.
302. Id. at*109.
303. Id. at *99.
304. Id. at*101.
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intermediate transactions leading up to that intended result. 307
The Tax Court concluded that
[t]he record clearly indicates that every step taken by the parties (the
formation of Andantech, the sale-leaseback of the equipment between
Comdisco and Andantech, the sale of the Comdisco rents to
NationsBank, and the contribution by Mr. Parmentier of his interest in
Andantech to RD Leasing) were but transitory steps. 308
Finally, the Tax Court reached the same result under the
interdependence test. The Tax Court explained the essence of this test:
"The interdependence test requires a court to find whether the individual
steps had independent significance or had meaning only as part of the
larger transaction., 30 9 Reviewing all the steps of the transaction, the Tax
Court concluded that
[s]tanding alone, none of the individual steps in the transaction at issue
is the type of business activity one would expect to see in a bona fide,
arm's-length business deal between unrelated parties, and none of
them makes any objective sense standing alone without contemplation
of the subsequent steps in the transaction. Each step in the transaction
leads inexorably to the next. Consequently, the interdependence test is
satisfied for application of the step transaction doctrine.
3 10
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision
that a partnership formed to engage in a lease stripping transaction
should be disregarded for tax purposes. 311  The D.C. Circuit only
focused on the economic substance of the partnership and agreed with
the Tax Court that the record established that the parties never intended
to join together as partners to run a business and that the partnership had
no legitimate non-tax purpose.3 12 The D.C. Circuit followed its decision
in ASA Investerings3 13 and stated that "the absence of a non-tax business
purpose for a partnership is fatal to its validity. 314
Thus, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision that the
partnership had no economic substance.3 15 The Court of Appeals did not
address the remaining Tax Court's holdings invalidating the entire
307. Id.
308. Id. at *103-04.
309. Id. at *106.
310. Id. at *111.
311. Andantech L.L.C. v. Comm'r, 331 F.3d 972, 981-82 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
312. Id. at 980.
313. ASA Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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transaction on economic substance and similar grounds.316 Instead, the
D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court to determine whether
the Tax Court had jurisdiction to decide the tax consequences of the
individual "partners" on a separate taxpayer basis.
317
B. Long Term Capital Holding
During 1996, Onslow Trading & Commercial LLC ("OTC")
contributed cash and the loss stock to Long Term Capital Partners LP
("LTCP") in exchange for a partnership interest in LTCP.31 8  OTC
borrowed the cash component of its contribution from Long-Term
Capital Management UK, a UK entity related to Long-Term Capital
Management LP ("LTCM"), the general partner of LTCP.3 19 In
addition, OTC purchased from LTCM a "liquidity put" and a "downside
put" with respect to its interest in LTCP.32° In December 1997, LTCP
sold some of the preferred stock with a basis of $107M for
approximately $1 M, producing a loss of $106 M, 32 1 which was allocated
to LTCM under I.R.C. §704(c).322
The IRS argued that under either the end result test or the
interdependence test, OTC's contributions of the preferred stock to
LTCP in exchange for a partnership interest and the subsequent sale of
that partnership interest to LTCM must be stepped together into a single
sale transaction with the result that LTCM acquired the stock for its cost
of $1.1 million.32 3
The court agreed with the IRS and applied the end result test.324
Specifically, the court observed that:
OTC's contributions of preferred stock to LTCP followed by the sale
of the received partnership interest to LTCM was in substance a sale of
the preferred stock for a purchase price determined as the greater of
316. Id. at 978.
317. Id.
318. Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 136 (D. Conn. 2004).
319. Id. at 136-37.
320. Id. In general, these puts, each of which could only be exercised on or between October
27, 1997 and October 31, 1997, gave OTC the right to put its interest in LTCP to LTCM for an
amount equal to the greater of (i) the value of such interest at the date of the put or (ii) OTC's
original capital investment in LTCP. Id. at 137. OTC exercised its liquidity put on October 28,
1997, selling its entire interest in LTCP to LTCM for $12,614,188, representing approximately a
22% return on OTC's investment. Id. at 137-38. Of course, no I.R.C. §754 election was made.
321. Id. at 199.
322. Id. at 139.
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$103,824 ($10,340,000 minus $121,000 option premiums, $787,883
interest on loan from LTCM (U.K.), $9,327,293 loan principal from
LTCM (U.K.)) or that amount plus the excess of the value of the
partnership interest over $10,340,000 between October 27-31, 1997.325
The court also concluded that this result was supported by the fact
that Long Term had no business purpose for the transaction other than
tax avoidance. 326  Thus, as discussed above, the court made a clear
connection between the business purpose and step transaction
principles.327 In particular, the court said that: (i) Long Term had no
interest in OTC as an investor; (ii) OTC had no interest in investing
specifically in LTCP and was only interested in obtaining cash for its
preferred stock; and (iii) OTC intended to exercise its put options
and Long Term understood and agreed to accommodate such intent.
328
Thus, the court concluded that "the various steps of the OTC
transaction were prearranged to ensure that OTC would sell its
partnership interests to LTCM by exercise of its put options, and that
B&B was not interested in an investment vehicle for OTC but looked to
earn fees (however disguised) from the sale of tax benefits., 3
29
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision.33° In particular, the taxpayer argued that the step transaction
principle should not apply where each step of the transaction had a valid
business purpose. 33 1 The Second Circuit disagreed and held that:
The district court did not err in finding that the sole purpose of the
transaction here was to transfer losses from OTC to LTCM and that
any intervening steps taken in pursuit of this goal were economically
meaningless. The manner in which LTCM increased its partnership
share-by routing money through OTC-was economically
meaningless because '[u]nder the step transaction doctrine, a particular
step in a transaction is disregarded for tax purposes if the taxpayer
could have achieved its objective more directly, but instead included
the step for no purpose than to avoid U.S. taxes.'
332




328. Long Term Capital Holdings, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 191-92.
329. Id. at 192.
330. Long-Term Capital Holdings, LP v. U.S., 150 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2005).
331. Id. at 43.
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Circuit concluded that "any economic effects that may have resulted




Similar to Long Term Capital Holdings, at the heart of this case
were high-basis, low-value assets, which the Tax Court described as
having "tantalizing tax attributes., 335 The government argued that the
taxpayers entered into partnership transactions designed to allow the tax
losses from certain assets to be deducted by parties that had not suffered
the losses and, to some extent, to allow the same economic losses to be
deducted twice. 336 To achieve this result, (1) the owners of the high-
basis assets transferred them to a partnership in exchange for partnership
interests while the taxpayer contributed cash to the same partnership, (2)
within the same month, the high-basis partnership interests were sold to
another partner, at a time when the partnership did not have an I.R.C. §
754 election, to step down the basis of the assets to their fair market
value, in effect and (3) shortly thereafter, some of the high-basis, low-
value assets were sold by the partnership, with the loss being allocated to
the partner that had purchased the partnership interest of the original
asset owner.
337
Applying the economic substance doctrine, and, alternatively, the
step transaction doctrine, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument
that formalistic compliance with statutory provisions necessarily entitles
it to the tax benefits provided therein, and held that "[n]otwithstanding
its form, the transaction did not, in substance, represent contributions of
property in exchange for partnership interests .... 338
Similar to Long Term Capital Holding, the IRS invoked the "end
result" test and argued that the contributions of the high-basis, low-value
receivables and stock to the partnership and purchase of the preferred
interests were really component parts of a single transaction intended
from the outset to transfer the built-in tax losses.
33 9
Furthermore, under the "interdependence" test, the IRS argued that
that these steps were so interdependent that "either transaction alone
333. Id.




338. Id. at 287.
339. Id. at 293.
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would have been fruitless without the other., 340  Accordingly, under
both tests, the IRS asked the court to conclude that the transaction
should be recast as a direct sale of the high-basis, low-value
receivables.34'
The court held that the step transaction applies to the transaction
under both tests. 342 The court observed that the contributions were made
solely for the purpose of transferring built-in tax losses to the Ackerman
group, which "could not obtain the built-in tax losses through a direct
purchase of the.., receivables and stock, but could only obtain those
losses by interposing a partnership and manipulating the partnership
basis rules." 3
Furthermore, the court concluded that
[f]rom the beginning, both parties planned and understood that CLIS
would receive a $5 million advisory fee and that the banks would
exercise their put rights at the earliest possible point (December 31,
1996), exiting the partnership. The contributions, the payment of the
advisory fee, and the exercise of the put rights were mutually
interdependent steps taken to dispose of Generale Bank's and CLIS's
'bad' investments in the SMHC receivables and stock and to transfer
the built-in tax losses to the Ackerman group.344
D. Summary
In all three cases, the courts begun with the economic substance
analysis and concluded first that the transactions had neither economic
substance nor business purpose. Thus, when the courts turned to the step
transaction discussion, it followed very naturally that the courts would
not accept the taxpayers' arguments that the step transaction doctrine
should not apply. Thus, in cases where the transaction is challenged on
both grounds, the economic substance challenge takes priority and,
normally, the step transaction analysis will be heavily influenced by the
decision on the first ground.
VII. PROPOSAL FOR CODIFICATION
In recent years, several legislative proposals to "codify" or "clarify"
340. Id. at 294.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 295.
344. Id. at 295-96.
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the economic substance doctrine have been introduced in the United
States Congress.345 These proposals, however, have been criticized not
only by commentators but also by Government officials on various
grounds.346  Some commentators have indicated that rather than
"codifying" or "clarifying" a common law doctrine, the proposed
legislation would set forth a new and higher standard, which has not
been adopted by the vast majority of courts.347 Various commentators
345. See generally Monte A. Jackel, For Better or For Worse: Codification of Economic
Substance, Tax Notes Today, May 18, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 96-33 (discussing the various
legislative proposals). Senators Grassley and Baucus, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Senate Finance Committee, have been the leading forces in promoting the codification of the
economic substance doctrine. Id.
"It has been over two years since the collapse of Enron, and corporate scandals are still
rampant," Baucus said. "Over the past year, I have included this tax shelter legislation
within a number of separate bills, and am now introducing it as a stand-alone bill in the
hopes of achieving passage once Congress returns in January. It is inexcusable that
Congress has not passed a single piece of tax shelter legislation to shut down these
abusive tax practices ... Tax shelters are not fair to the corporations and taxpayers who
strive to comply with the law," said Baucus. "We need to work on restoring faith in our
tax system. Every day we fail to address abusive tax shelter practices, honest taxpayers
pay the bill. The legislation Chairman Grassley and I introduced today will help combat
abusive tax avoidance transactions.... There may be other proposals that should be
examined to see if they can better shut down transactions without economic substance. I
intend to work with Senator Grassley on alternative and additional proposals in the
coming months," Baucus said... "I look forward to continuing to work together with
Chairman Grassley to enact strong and meaningful tax shelter legislation early next
year," Baucus added. "I urge all of my congressional colleagues-in the House and the
Senate-to join forces and send tax shelter legislation to the President for his signature.
It is time to shut down these tax shelters and restore professional ethics. Congress cannot
ignore this problem any longer.
Id. (quoting Sen. Max Baucus, Baucus Introduces Bill to End Abusive Tax Shelters, Tax Notes
Today, Nov. 25, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 227-28).
346. See Jane G. Gravelle, CRS Reviews Revenue-Raising Proposals Of The 108th Congress,
Tax Notes Today, Feb. 28, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 38-68, which notes the following commentary
opposing the codification:
[T]he letter from Andrew Berg to Chairman Thomas and Senator Grassley on the
economic substance doctrine and the Apr. 24 letter to Chairman Grassley and Ranking
Member Baucus from Herbert Belier of the American Bar Association (reprinted in the
Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Tax Report, Apr. 28, 2003). See also New York State
Bar Association Tax Section, "Economic Substance Codification," Tax Notes, June 23,
2003; Peter L. Faber, letter to the Chairman Thomas, reprinted as "Practitioner to
Congress: Don't Try to Codify Economic Substance," Tax Notes, Oct. 21, 2002, pp.
423-424; James M. Peaslee, letter to the Finance Committee, reprinted as "More
Thoughts on Proposed Economic Substance Clarification," Tax Notes, May 5, 2003, pp.
747-750, May 5, 2003.
Id.
347. See id, n.13, citing the following commentary opposing the codification: an August 5,
2003 letter from Andrew Berg to Chairman Thomas and Senator Grassley on the economic
substance doctrine, and an Apr. 24 letter to Chairman Grassley and Ranking Member Baucus from
Herbert Belier of the American Bar Association, reprinted in the Bureau of National Affairs, Daily
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have also warned that the proposed legislation could apply to common
tax structuring and otherwise clearly permissible transactions.348
In my view, codification of the step transaction doctrine would be
more acceptable because the doctrine is less controversial than the
economic substance doctrine. In particular, while there are many
uncertainties pertaining to the application of the economic substance's
two prong test, courts have been more consistent in applying the step
transaction doctrine. As discussed above, the main controversies
involved in the application of the step transaction doctrine are as
follows. First, some courts have stated that if the IRS satisfies one of the
three alternative tests, it would be enough to conclude that the step
transaction ought to apply, while other courts have determined that the
IRS should satisfy more than one test. Assuming that the binding
commitment test is rarely used, in my view, it is very unlikely that court
will determine that the transaction falls under the end result test but not
the interdependence test or vice versa. Thus, as I conclude herein, it is
really a two-prong test.
Second, another issue pertaining to the application of the step
transaction doctrine is whether satisfying the economic
substance/business purpose test for each step can preclude the
application of the step transaction doctrine. In my view, if a taxpayer
can show that each step has economic substance, is should be another
factor in not applying the doctrine, and then the court will consider all
the other relevant factors and determine if the step transaction doctrine
should apply to the disputed transaction. Thus, the existence of
economic substance will be one factor out of several.
I suggest, therefore, to codifying the step transaction doctrine in a
way that will be consistent with the vast majority of court decisions as
well as IRS pronouncements.
First, the proposed code section would define the term "step
transaction doctrine" as "the common law doctrine under which separate
transactions or steps may be treated as a single, unified transaction for
tax purposes." The provision can also state that it only codifies the step
Tax Report, Apr. 28, 2003. See also New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Economic
Substance Codification, Tax Notes Today, June 23, 2003, Lexis, 2003 TNT 121-26; Peter L. Faber,
letter to Chairman Thomas, reprinted as Practitioner to Congress: Don't Try to Codify Economic
Substance, Tax Notes Today, Oct. 21, 2002, Lexis, 2002 TNT 204-60, 423-424.
348. See James M. Peaslee, Economic Substance Codification Gets Worse, Tax Notes Today,
May 20, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 97-28 ("The profit test will be failed by many transactions that
should be found to have economic substance"); Terrill A. Hyde and Glen Arlen Kohl, The Shelter
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transaction doctrine but not other common law anti abuse rules.
Second, the proposed code section should state that the step
transaction doctrine would apply to a given transaction if both the
following two conditions are met: (i) the separate steps are a part of a
single scheme designed to achieve a single result; and (ii) the steps are
interdependent on one another. Thus, the IRS would have to show that
both tests are satisfied to prevail. As set forth above, while the first
prong is subjective and the second one is objective, it is very unlikely
that a court would find that one prong is satisfied but not the other.
The code provision would add the following factors that can assist
in a determination that the doctrine should apply or not: (i) whether at
the time the first step takes place, the taxpayer was under a commitment
to complete the remaining steps; (ii) whether the time between each step
was significantly short (e.g., several hours); and (iii) whether each step
separately has economic substance. As discussed herein, while the first
two factors would be in favor of the government, the last one would be
in favor of the taxpayer. None of the factors, however, would be
conclusive by itself.
Once it is determined that applying the step transaction doctrine to
the particular case is appropriate, the proposed code provision should
state the related actions by the IRS. If the step transaction doctrine
applies, the court could either: (i) disregard transactions or steps in a
transaction that it believes are unnecessary; or (ii) change the order of
such transaction or steps. Nevertheless, the provision should emphasize
that the IRS may not generate events which never took place.
Finally, regulations with particular examples would have to be
issued by Treasury to provide the practical aspects of the rule. Such
regulations could supply exemptions for individuals, for example, or for
small transactions. Also, the examples contained in such regulations
could include some of the cases discussed herein.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS - THE FUTURE OF THE STEP TRANSACTION
PRINCIPLE
When courts are faced with a set of disputed steps or transactions
the result of which provides a tax benefit to the taxpayer, the generally
react by:
[E]nunciat[ing] a variety of doctrines, such as step transaction,
business purpose, and substance over form. Although the various
doctrines overlap and it is not always clear in a particular case which
one is most appropriate, their common premise is that the substantive
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realities of a transaction determine its tax consequences.
349
Nevertheless, as discussed above, in many recent cases, the IRS
first challenged, and the courts first discussed, the economic
substance/business purpose of the disputed transactions. Then, as an
alternative argument and when it was applicable, the IRS has raised the
step transaction doctrine. Furthermore, in many cases, the courts held
that the question whether the step transaction ought to apply to a
disputed transaction at all depends on whether the transaction had
economic substance. Some courts have refused to apply the step
transaction doctrine when each step of the transaction had economic
substance. Thus, it appears that the step transaction doctrine has become
another "prong" of a bigger economic substance/business purpose
analysis.
In my view, the role of the step transaction principle has diminished
over the years and as of today, the principle serves as an alterative
argument rather than the primary one.3 5° When a series of steps or
transactions can be challenged in general as lacking economic substance
and business purpose, the IRS prefers to begin with the economic
substance doctrine. Once a court determines that the transaction had
neither economic substance nor business purpose, it can move to the step
transaction discussion, if applicable and "transform" the steps or
transaction into their "true" substance.
As a result, codification of the doctrine would benefit not only the
IRS but also the taxpayers; both will have some certainty pertaining to
the question whether the doctrine should apply to the disputed
transaction. In my view, this proposed codification is not only consistent
with existing case law but also with the IRS's view of the doctrine.
349. King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
350. For a similar view, see Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Substance Over Form: The
Cornerstone of Our Tax System or a Lethal Weapon In The IRS's Arsenal?, 8 AKRON TAX J. 91,
107 (1991).
Several recent cases, however, indicate that the step-transaction doctrine, as well as the
related one of substance over form, may be easier for the taxpayer to overcome than at
any time in the past. The IRS seems reluctant to argue its position on the basis of the
step-transaction doctrine (favoring instead the more general substance over form
doctrine), and the courts appear equally hesitant to apply it where the taxpayer has
rigidly adhered to the form of the transactions. Thus, while the step-transaction doctrine
has historically caused much anxiety because of its lack of precision, recent cases
suggest that it is less threatening-i.e., less of a lethal weapon, and perhaps less of a
cornerstone of sound taxation.
Id. (internal citations omitted); See also Robert W. Wood, Is the Step Transaction Doctrine Still a
Threat for Taxpayers?, 72 J. TAX'N 296 (1990) ("Recent decisions indicate that the step-transaction
doctrine may not be assiduously applied by the courts as it has been in the past").
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Thus, it is not expected to be heavily criticized as the proposed
codification of the economic substance doctrine was. In addition, since
the step transaction has become only an alternative route rather than the
primary weapon against tax shelters, it seems that the codification of the
doctrine should draw so much public attention.
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